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Abstract 
Biased attention toward threatening facial expressions is an important maintaining and 
possibly aetiological factor for social anxiety. However, little is known about the underlying 
mechanisms. To develop our understanding of this threat bias, the relative contributions of 
top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history were differentiated across four 
studies. In Study One, the roles of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection 
history were tested in an unselected sample using a modification of the dot-probe task, in 
which participants were cued to attend to a happy or angry face on each trial. Results showed 
that attentional orienting toward facial expressions was not exclusively driven by bottom-up 
attentional capture as some previous theories suggest; but instead, participants could shift 
attention toward emotional faces in a top-down manner. This effect was eliminated when the 
faces were inverted, demonstrating that top-down attention relies on holistic face processing. 
Study One found no evidence of selection history (i.e., no improvement on repeated trials or 
blocks of trials in which the task was to orient to the same expression). Study Two tested 
whether this ability to use top-down attention to orient to emotional faces is impaired for 
individuals with social anxiety. Using the same task as Study One, Study Two found that 
participants with higher levels of social anxiety were selectively impaired in attentional 
shifting toward a cued happy face when it was paired with an angry face, but not when paired 
with a neutral face. These results indicate that high social anxiety is associated with deficits 
in top-down control of attention, which are selectively revealed in the presence of non-task-
relevant threat. The results of Study Two could be explained by bottom-up attention to threat 
or a top-down set for threat that could not be overcome by the instruction to attend to a happy 
face. To test this, Study Three utilised a modified dot-probe task in which participants were 
presented with an upright face paired with an inverted face (displaying a disgust or neutral 
expression) and engagement with and disengagement of attention from threatening faces 
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were measured separately. The task was performed under no, low, and high working-memory 
load conditions. Since working-memory load draws on the same resources as top-down 
attention, interference from increasing working-memory load on attentional orienting would 
point to a role for top-down attention. Social anxiety was not associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat. However, surprisingly, high social anxiety was associated with an 
engagement bias away from threat, while low social anxiety was associated with a bias 
toward threat. These results were unaffected by the working-memory load manipulation. 
However, some methodological issues were identified with the study. Study Four overcame 
these methodological issues by using a paired angry and neutral face under no, low and high 
working-memory load conditions. Higher levels of social anxiety were associated with 
increased engagement with threat under no-load, but not under low- and high-load conditions. 
Thus, this body of research provides evidence that social anxiety is associated with an 
engagement bias to threat, which is driven by top-down attention.  
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Chapter One. Introduction 
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Rationale for Thesis and Aims 
Imagine giving a speech to a room full of people. The crowd looks up at you with a 
variety of facial expressions; some appear happy and supportive, some neutral, and others 
appear bored and judgmental. Which faces do you focus on? Research indicates that socially 
anxious people preferentially allocate attention to threatening facial expressions. Indeed, 
theoretical and empirical research indicates that this bias is a maintaining, and possibly even 
an aetiological, factor contributing to social anxiety symptoms (MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; 
MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; 
Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). This is because when giving a speech, for example, if you only 
notice the audience members displaying critical expressions and ignore the smiling faces you 
may believe that you are giving a terrible speech and are incompetent, fueling the fears 
underlying social anxiety. 
This thesis explores the underlying mechanisms of biased attention to threatening 
stimuli for individuals with high social anxiety. Key aims of the research were to test the 
roles of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history in attentional orienting 
to emotional faces, and to examine how these differ as a function of an individual’s level of 
social anxiety. Methodologically, the studies in this thesis employed experimental paradigms 
administered to participants via computer, in conjunction with self-reported measures of 
social anxiety obtained via validated questionnaires. Social anxiety was treated as a 
dimensional trait in the population, consistent with current conceptualisations of the construct 
and methodological recommendations (Bogels et al., 2010). Of course, high levels of social 
anxiety symptoms indicate a risk for Social Anxiety Disorder, but importantly a diagnostic 
category was not necessarily invoked when the terminology “social anxiety” was employed 
throughout this thesis. All participants were recruited from the Australian National University 
undergraduate classes and the university’s online advertising portals.  
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Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of nine chapters. Chapter One includes a brief introduction to 
the thesis. Chapter Two provides an overview of Social Anxiety Disorder. This chapter is 
subdivided into two main sections. The first section provides an overview of the clinical 
profile of Social Anxiety Disorder, including the diagnostic criteria, prevalence, course, and 
outcomes, and the assessment of social anxiety symptomology. The second section provides 
an overview of the main theoretical models of social anxiety relevant to this thesis. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of visual attention. This chapter is subdivided 
into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of attention. The second section 
explores the selective nature of visual attention. The third section describes the three main 
types of attention: spatial attention, feature-based attention, and object-based attention. 
Finally, the fourth section describes the underlying mechanisms of attention, which can be 
driven by top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and/or selection history.  
Chapter Four reviews the research on biased attention to threat associated with social 
anxiety. This chapter is subdivided into four sections. Section one explores the components 
of attention; engagement with threat, disengagement from threat, and avoidance of threat. 
The measurement of attentional biases is then discussed in section two. Evidence for attention 
bias modification is explored in section three. Finally, in the fourth section, the relative 
contributions of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history are discussed 
in relation to the threat bias.  
Chapter Five presents a study investigating the attentional mechanisms underlying the 
ability to orient to emotional faces. This study utilized a dot-probe design with photographs 
of happy, neutral, and angry faces. This is the first study, to our knowledge, that has tested 
the relative contributions of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history for 
attentional orienting to facial expressions.  
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Chapter Six extends on Chapter Five by investigating how these relative mechanisms 
of attention are affected by social anxiety. This chapter focuses in whether participants with 
relatively higher levels of social anxiety, compared with participants with lower levels of 
social anxiety, have impaired top-down control of attention in the presence of threat.  
Chapter Seven investigates whether the threat bias associated with social anxiety is 
driven by bottom-up capture of attention or top-down attention. This study utilized a 
modified dot-probe task, which differentiated biases of enhanced attentional engagement with 
threat and delayed attentional disengagement from threat. The dot-probe task was conducted 
under working-memory (WM) load designed to exhaust available top-down attentional 
resources. This chapter, therefore, tests whether engagement and disengagement biases are 
present or eliminated by the addition of WM load, and are either driven by bottom-up or top-
down attention.   
The research in Chapter Eight was conducted due to some unusual research findings 
from Chapter Seven. It was hypothesized that the findings of Chapter Seven were due to 
methodological factors that interfered with detecting a threat bias for socially anxious 
participants. The new data in Chapter Eight provides a re-examination of whether the threat 
bias associated with social anxiety is driven by bottom-up capture of attention or top-down 
attention. This chapter reveals different findings to Chapter Seven, emphasising the 
importance of particular methodological decisions when attempting to measure the threat 
bias. This chapter also provides critical information on top-down contributions to the threat 
bias for individuals with high levels of social anxiety. 
Chapter Nine presents a summary of the discoveries of this thesis and discusses how 
the research findings contribute to the knowledge of social anxiety based on past research as 
well as theoretical models. This chapter is subdivided into five main sections. Firstly, 
engagement and disengagement attentional biases are discussed. Secondly, the role of 
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attentional control when orienting to emotional faces is explored. Thirdly, top-down 
attentional contributions to the threat bias associated with social anxiety are explored. 
Fourthly, this chapter considers the interactions between the race of participants and the 
photographic face stimuli employed and, finally, the role of top-down attention toward 
temporal threat biases is discussed.  
Thesis Format and Publication Details 
Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight were each prepared as individual manuscripts for 
journal publication. The text in these chapters is identical to the versions of the manuscripts 
that are published or under-review, except the numbering has been altered to reflect the page 
numbering of the thesis.  
Currently, Chapter Seven has been published and Chapters Five, Six, and Eight are 
under review following requests for revisions. I am the first author of all the manuscripts and 
contributions from the authors listed are outlined at the start of each chapter. Note that 
Chapter Seven was published under my maiden name of H. L. Boal. Publication status for 
each manuscript is as follows: 
Chapter Five:  
Delchau, H. L., Christensen, B. K., Lipp, O. V., O’Kearney, R., Bandara, K. H., Tan, 
N., Yabuki, H., & Goodhew, S. C. (Review and re-submit decision received 
20/05/2019 from Acta Psychologica; Revised version submitted 02/07/2019). 
Searching for emotion: A top-down set governs attentional orienting to facial 
expressions.   
Chapter Six  
Delchau, H. L., Christensen, B. K., Lipp, O. V., & Goodhew, S. C. (Review and re-
submit decision received 16/05/2019 from Emotion;  Revised version submitted 
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01/07/2019). The effect of social anxiety on top-down attentional orienting to 
emotional faces. 
Chapter Seven 
Boal, H. L., Christensen, B. K., & Goodhew, S, C (2018). Social anxiety and 
attentional biases: A top-down contribution? Attention, Perception, and 
Psychophysics, 80(1), 42-53. doi:10.3758/s13414-017-1415-5. 
Chapter Eight 
Delchau, H. L., Christensen, B.K., O’Kearney, R. & Goodhew, S.C. (Review and re-
submit decision received 26/03/2019 from Attention, Perception and Psychophysics; 
Revised version submitted 9/07/2019). What is top-down about seeing enemies? 
Social anxiety and attention to threat.  
  
7 
 
References 
Bogels, S. M., Alden, L., Beidel, D. C., Clark, L. A., Pine, D. S., Stein, M. B., & Voncken, 
M. (2010). Social anxiety disorder: Questions and answers for the DSM-V. 
Depression and Anxiety, 27(2), 168-189. doi:10.1002/da.20670 
MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (2012). Cognitive bias modification approaches to anxiety. 
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 189-217. doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-
032511-143052 
MacLeod, C., Rutherford, E., Campbell, L., Ebsworthy, G., & Holker, L. (2002). Selective 
attention and emotional vulnerability: Assessing the causal basis of their association 
through the experimental manipulation of attentional bias. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 111(1), 107-123. doi:10.1037//0021-843x.111.1.107 
Rapee, R. M., & Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety in social 
phobia. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 35(8), 741-756. doi:10.1016/S0005-
7967(97)00022-3 
Van Bockstaele, B., Verschuere, B., Tibboel, H., De Houwer, J., Crombez, G., & Koster, E. 
H. (2014). A review of current evidence for the causal impact of attentional bias on 
fear and anxiety. Psychological Bulletin, 140(3), 682-721. doi:10.1037/a0034834 
 
 
 
 
  
8 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two. Literature Review: Clinical and Theoretical Overview of 
Social Anxiety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a brief clinical profile of Social Anxiety Disorder and the major 
theoretical explanations of the disorder. This chapter is not an exhaustive overview of social 
anxiety but instead provides the reader with the empirical and theoretical foundations to 
understand the context for the studies in this thesis. Later chapters provide more specific 
information on the empirical gaps in the literature and the specific research focus of this 
thesis. 
Introduction and Clinical Profile of Social Anxiety 
This section outlines the research on the symptoms of social anxiety, which shows 
that these symptoms vary on a continuum from fearlessness to Social Anxiety Disorder. The 
course, prevalence, and outcomes of Social Anxiety Disorder and its assessment are then 
discussed. 
Social Anxiety  
Humans have a strong need to be liked and valued so as to build and maintain social 
relationships (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). Hunter-gatherer societies frequently faced 
challenges to survival, including: resisting attacks from other people and animals, foraging 
for food, illness, and need for warmth. In these situations, not belonging to a social group was 
deadly. Even in modern society, where challenges to survival are less extreme, social 
isolation is associated with cognitive decline (Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2009) and early 
mortality (Steptoe, Shankar, Demakakos, & Wardle, 2013). This indicates that it is important 
for us to monitor our social environment and ensure that we are liked and accepted by others 
to increase our chances of survival and overall health and wellbeing. Low levels of social 
anxiety may, therefore, have survival value through facilitating social connectedness, but as 
levels rise the effects become increasingly negative and at high levels become extreme and 
debilitating. 
10 
 
 As early as 1870, social anxiety received recognition as distinct from other phobias 
(Marks, 1970, 1985) but it was not until 1980 that Social Phobia was formally identified as a 
mental disorder and was included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Social Phobia, also known as 
Social Anxiety Disorder, is characterised by an intense, persistent fear of being negatively 
evaluated by others. See Table 1 for the diagnostic criteria. 
Table 1 
Diagnostic criteria for Social Anxiety Disorder (300.23, F40.10) as outlined in the DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
A. Marked fear or anxiety about one or more social situations in which the individual is 
exposed to possible scrutiny by others. Examples include social interactions 
(e.g., having a conversation, meeting unfamiliar people), being observed (e.g., eating 
or drinking), or performing in front of others (e.g., giving a speech). 
Note: In children, the anxiety must occur in peer settings and not just during 
interactions with adults. 
B. The individual fears that he or she will act in a way or show anxiety symptoms that 
will be negatively evaluated (i.e., will be humiliating or embarrassing; will lead to 
rejection or offend others). 
C. The social situations almost always provoke fear or anxiety.  
Note: in children, the fear or anxiety may be expressed by crying, tantrums, freezing, 
clinging, shrinking, or failing to speak in social situations. 
D. The social situations are avoided or endured with intense fear or anxiety. 
E. The fear or anxiety is out of proportion to the actual threat posed by the social 
situation and to the sociocultural context. 
F. The fear, anxiety, or avoidance is persistent, typically lasting for six months or more. 
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G. The fear, anxiety, or avoidance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
H. The fear, anxiety, or avoidance is not attributable to the physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or another medical condition. 
I. The fear, anxiety, or avoidance is not better explained by the symptoms of another 
mental disorder, such as panic disorder, body dysmorphic disorder, or autism 
spectrum disorder. 
J. If another medical condition (e.g., Parkinson’s disease, obesity, disfigurement from 
burns or injury) is present, the fear, anxiety, or avoidance is clearly unrelated or is 
excessive. 
Specify if:  
Performance only: If the fear is restricted to speaking or performing in public. 
Although an actual diagnosis of Social Anxiety Disorder is based on a categorical 
model, in which an individual either meets sufficient criteria for a diagnosis of the disorder or 
does not meet sufficient criteria, it is better to view social anxiety symptoms as varying on a 
continuum within the population (e.g., Bogels et al., 2010). McNeil (2010) presents a model 
of social anxiety as a continuum from “fearlessness” at one extreme, “normal fears and 
anxieties” in the centre of the continuum, and “Social Anxiety Disorders” at the other 
extreme. This recognises that it is normal for healthy individuals to display anxiety in 
particular social situations, such as giving speeches, dating, and interviewing for jobs. 
However, high levels of social anxiety impact individuals’ ability to socialise, work and 
study, and function on a day-to-day basis. These people often avoid social interactive and 
performance situations or, when they do engage in them, experience extreme distress.   
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Prevalence, Course, and Outcomes of Social Anxiety  
The lifetime prevalence rate of Social Anxiety Disorder has been estimated to range 
between 7% to 12% of the population (Furmark, 2002; Kessler et al., 2005), and one-year 
prevalence is estimated to be between 5% to 8%. This makes it the most common anxiety 
disorder and one of the most common psychiatric disorders (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, 
McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996; Offord et al., 1996; Wittchen, Nelson, & Lachner, 1998). 
Further adding to the serious and debilitating nature of social anxiety is that it is highly 
comorbid with other conditions, such as depression (Stein & Chavira, 1998; Stein & Kean, 
2000). Social Anxiety Disorder typically onsets in early adolescence, with a median age of 13 
(Kessler et al., 2005; Wittchen & Fehm, 2003), though onset can also occur in childhood 
(Hirshfeld-Becker et al., 2010; Ollendick & Hirshfeld-Becker, 2002). The average gender 
ratio (female : male) has been found to range from equality (Moutier & Stein, 1999) to 
slightly higher rates of social anxiety for women (3:2 ratio; Kessler et al., 2005).  
The disorder can have a devastating impact on quality of life and social and 
occupational functioning. Compared with healthy controls, individuals with Social Anxiety 
Disorder were found to have greater functional difficulties, less life satisfaction, poorer self-
perceived well-being, greater likelihood to fail a grade or drop out of school (Stein & Kean, 
2000), increased alcohol use (Morris, Stewart, & Ham, 2005), greater unemployment, 
increased suicidality, reduced social support, and relationship difficulties (Davidson, Hughes, 
George, & Blazer, 1993; Wittchen & Beloch, 1996). As an example of relationship 
difficulties, in a study of individuals with Social Anxiety Disorder and matched controls, 
Wittchen and Beloch (1996) found that 34% of individuals with the disorder were married 
compared with 57% in the control group. Individuals with Social Anxiety Disorder were 
more likely to have never been married and more likely to have been divorced, of those who 
had been married. In addition to the often debilitating impact of the disorder, social anxiety is 
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typically a chronic condition with high relapse rates. In particular, childhood Social Anxiety 
Disorder is difficult to treat, with research finding lower gains in treatment compared to 
children with other anxiety disorders. For example, Ginsburg et al. (2011) reported that, when 
treated with cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), 40.6% of children with Social Anxiety 
Disorder achieved remission compared with 72.0% of children with other anxiety disorders. 
Even treatments specifically designed to treat childhood Social Anxiety Disorder have been 
found to result in only a 50-70% remission rate (Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 2000; Donovan, 
Cobham, Waters, & Occhipinti, 2015). 
The picture of social anxiety in adulthood is similarly chronic. Using retrospective 
interviews, Chartier, Hazen, and Stein (1998) discovered that the average duration of 
untreated Social Anxiety Disorder is 29 years. This is worth noting as treatment among 
individuals with Social Anxiety Disorder is low; across nine high-income countries, the 
World Health Survey found that only 20.8% of individuals with the disorder sought 
professional help (Ormel et al., 2008). 
For individuals who do seek treatment, options include psychotherapy and 
psychopharmacology. From a meta-analysis of treatments for social anxiety, Mayo-Wilson et 
al. (2014) recommended that psychotherapy should be the first-line treatment, specifically 
recommending the use of CBT. The study also recommended selective-serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs) as the next course of treatment for patients who refused psychotherapy. To 
compare CBT and psychodynamic treatment, Leichsenring et al. (2013) recruited 495 
patients with Social Anxiety Disorder and randomly assigned them to manual-guided CBT, 
manual-guided psychodynamic treatment, or waitlist control. CBT and psychodynamic 
treatments included up to 25 50-minute sessions and remission and response rates were 
assessed. For the study, a positive response was defined as at least a 31% score reduction of 
social anxiety symptoms on the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale. Withdrawal rates for the 
14 
 
CBT group, psychodynamic group, and waitlist group were 24%, 28%, and 27%, 
respectively. Remission rates were 36%, 26%, and 9% respectively, and response rates were 
60%, 52% and 15% respectively. That is, CBT and psychodynamic treatments were superior 
to the waitlist for remission rates and response rates, and CBT was superior to 
psychodynamic treatment for remission rates. Of the patients who completed treatment, 
remission rates were 42% and 30% and response rates were 66% and 56% for CBT and 
psychodynamic treatment, respectively. These results demonstrate that psychotherapy, and in 
particular CBT, is an effective treatment for Social Anxiety Disorder. However, the study 
showed that this disorder is difficult to treat with less than half of patients receiving remission 
after approximately 25 sessions of treatment. 
Assessment of Social Anxiety  
Assessment of social anxiety can include clinical interviews, structured interviews, 
interviewer-rated scales, self-report measures, self-monitoring tools, and physiological 
measures of distress (see Herbert, Rheingold, & Brandsma, 2010). In the current thesis, I 
utilised self-report measures because they provide rapid, quantitative data. Two social anxiety 
self-report measures were employed: the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & 
Clarke, 1998) and the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report (LSAS-SR; Liebowitz, 
1987). The SIAS measures anxiety experienced in social interactive situations, such as: 
talking to people in authority, meeting people at parties, and making eye contact. This 
measure consists of 20 items and, for each item (e.g., “When mixing socially, I am 
uncomfortable”), participants are asked to make a rating from 0 (“Not at all characteristic or 
true of me”) to 4 (“Extremely characteristic or true of me”). This yields a score between 0 
and 80. Past research found a mean of 20 in a community group. The researchers also 
recommended a cut-off of 34 for probable social anxiety, which represents one standard 
deviation above the mean of the sample. The SIAS has been found to have good reliability. 
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For example, with a large university and community sample, Mattick and Clarke (1998) 
obtained good internal consistency (Cronbach’s a = 0.94), test-retest reliability (correlation 
coefficient = 0.92), discriminant validity, and construct validity. In addition, participants who 
received treatment for social anxiety had significant reductions in SIAS scores whereas 
participants who did not engage in treatment did not show significant score reductions. 
The LSAS was originally developed as a clinician-administered measure of fear and 
anxiety experienced in 24 social situations, such as “Going to a party” and “Meeting 
strangers”. However, a self-report LSAS measure has also been developed (Fresco et al., 
2001). Ratings are made on two 4-point Likert-type scales, with fear rated from 0 (none) to 3 
(severe) and avoidance rated from 0 (never) to 3 (usually, 68%-100%). A total score can be 
calculated by summing scores from both the fear and avoidance scales (maximum score = 
144). In addition, 13 of the questions measure performance situations (e.g., “Giving a report 
to a group”) and 13 of the questions measure social interactive situations (e.g., “Speaking up 
at a meeting”). This measure was selected as it has good psychometric properties (Baker, 
Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann, 2002; Fresco et al., 2001; Levin, Marom, Gur, Wechter, & 
Hermesh, 2002; Oakman, Van Ameringen, Mancini, & Farvolden, 2003; Rytwinski et al., 
2009), is brief and easily administered, and provides overall and subscale social anxiety 
scores. The self-report LSAS has been found to have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
a = 0.95 for patients with Social Anxiety Disorder and 0.94 for non-anxious control 
participants), convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Fresco et al., 2001). 
Although the current thesis utilised the SIAS in Chapter Seven (which was the first 
study conducted), I preferred using the LSAS for studies in Chapters Five, Six, and Eight. 
The SIAS specifically measures fear of social interaction rather than fear of performance 
situations – a separate measure, the Social Phobia Scale was instead developed for this 
purpose. By contrast, the LSAS provides an overall measure of social anxiety, which includes 
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both performance and interaction fears. The LSAS was, therefore, deemed a more 
comprehensive measure of social anxiety. In addition, the SIAS has been criticised for its 
reversed-scored items, which have been found to reduce the measure’s validity (Rodebaugh 
et al., 2011). The LSAS overcomes this limitation as all the items are positively worded and 
easy to understand.  
Theoretical Explanations of Social Anxiety 
Clark and Wells (1995): A Cognitive Model of Social Phobia  
Clark and Wells (1995) proposed that people with social anxiety desire to create a 
favourable impression of themselves to others but believe that it is unlikely that they will 
achieve this and that behaving in an unacceptable manner will have disastrous consequences 
(e.g., rejection and loss of status and worth). This situation automatically activates an 
“anxiety program”, which consists of a series of cognitive, somatic, affective, and 
behavioural changes within the individual. From an evolutionary perspective, these changes 
can have advantages by mobilising the individual in the face of threat and danger. However, 
for socially anxious individuals, the response is disproportionate to the actual danger. As seen 
in Figure 1, when faced with a social situation, socially anxious individuals activate 
dysfunctional assumptions, which cause them to interpret the social situation as dangerous. 
Individuals then engage in self-focussed attention, noticing their behavioural, somatic, and 
cognitive symptoms, which reinforces their anxiety. 
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Figure 1. Clark and Well’s (1995) cognitive model of social anxiety. 
Clark and Well’s (1995) model predicted that the following factors maintain high 
anxiety for individuals with social anxiety: 
1. Symptoms of anxiety (e.g., racing heart and blushing) are perceived as dangerous, 
which further increases anxiety.  
2. Increased self-focussed attention on physical sensations and anxious thoughts 
leading to a reduced ability to focus attention on social cues. 
3. Socially anxious individuals tend to behave in ways (e.g., acting less warmly) that 
lead others to be less friendly toward them, thus reinforcing their anxiety. 
4. Some behavioural symptoms reinforce other feared symptoms (e.g., talking 
rapidly increases symptoms of hyperventilation, increased heart rate, dizziness 
etc).   
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This model asserted that socially anxious individuals form impressions of themselves 
that they assume matches the view that others have formed. However, this impression is 
frequently false or exaggerated. For example, an individual who blushes when anxious may 
have an exaggerated image of themselves as “beetroot” red, whereby the reality is 
significantly less noticeable. Social anxiety is also maintained by safety behaviours. 
Examples of safety behaviours include: standing on the outside of a social group to avoid 
scrutiny, asking frequent questions in conversation to avoid talking about oneself, and 
drinking alcohol or taking drugs to reduce feelings of anxiety. This cognitive model also 
conceptualised that the following types of dysfunctional negative beliefs underpin symptoms 
of social anxiety: 
1. Excessively high standards for social performance (e.g., “I must always be 
intelligent”, “I must always look my best”).  
2. Conditional beliefs concerning social evaluation (e.g., “If I make a mistake, I will 
be disliked”).  
3. Unconditional beliefs about the self (e.g., “I’m stupid”, “I’m different”, “I’m 
unattractive”). These beliefs are unstable, as socially anxious individuals may 
have a positive view of themselves when alone or with close friends and family, 
but have these negative self-beliefs triggered in other social situations.   
Anticipatory anxiety and post-event processing were also considered in Clark and 
Wells’ model of social anxiety. They contended that, prior to social events, socially anxious 
individuals imagine themselves in the upcoming situation, predicting negative consequences 
and dwelling on past failures. Furthermore, after a social event, they ruminate on the event, 
evaluating their performance as overly negative, and often interpret it in line with past social 
failures.  
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Rapee and Heimberg (1997): A Cognitive-Behavioral Model of Anxiety in Social Phobia  
Similar to Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, Rapee and Heimberg (1997) proposed that 
individuals with social anxiety desire positive approval by others but assume that others are 
inherently critical. As seen in Figure 2, social anxiety symptoms are triggered by the presence 
of a perceived audience, which refers to any person or group of people that may observe the 
individual. In this model, socially anxious people develops an image of themselves based on 
what they imagine that the audience is perceiving. People initially have a “baseline” image of 
themselves from long-term memory (e.g., based on images of themselves from photos and 
mirrors), previous feedback from others, and past experiences in social situations. This 
baseline image tends to be more negative for people with Social Anxiety Disorder than 
people without Social Anxiety Disorder. 
According to Rapee and Heimberg, individuals then engage in self-monitoring to 
modify their baseline image in a moment-by-moment manner, by monitoring their own facial 
expression, posture, actions, and physical sensations that could affect their appearance 
(e.g., feeling hot could result in sweating). They also monitor their audience members for 
feedback on their social performance (e.g., frowns or yawns). Socially anxious individuals 
use these sources of information to dynamically alter the mental representation that they 
believe others hold of them, which guides their judgement about the probability and 
consequences of negative evaluation. This can create a feedback loop of intensifying anxiety, 
with perceptions of anxious bodily sensations and others’ negative evaluation leading to 
greater levels of anxiety, causing even greater attention to these sources of information. This 
model, therefore, predicted that socially anxious individuals are both hypervigilant to threat 
and have delayed disengagement of attention from threat. 
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Figure 2. Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety in social 
phobia. 
In addition, Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) model predicted that socially anxious 
individuals experience a range of behavioural, cognitive, and physical signs of anxiety. 
Socially anxious individuals tend to engage in subtle avoidance behaviours (e.g., avoiding 
eye contact, reducing voice tone, and standing on the periphery of a group). However, this 
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tends to result in poorer social performance, resulting in the opposite effect than intended. 
Socially anxious individuals also tend to have negative cognitions, believing that others are 
judging them. They are more likely to interpret ambiguous situations as negative, the 
consequences of negative social events as catastrophic, and discount positive social 
information. Finally, socially anxious individuals are more likely to experience physical 
symptoms of anxiety such as blushing, sweating, and muscle twitches. They then 
overestimate the noticeability of these physical signs of anxiety, leading to catastrophic 
predictions of resulting judgements from others, thus further reinforcing their anxiety. 
Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) model has been updated by Heimberg, Brozovich, and 
Rapee (2010) and extended on more recently by Heimberg, Brozovich, and Rapee (2014). 
Though the fundamentals of the model have remained consistent, the updated model further 
developed the concepts of anticipatory anxiety, expected standards of performance, post-
event processing and emotional regulation and expression. Thus, when anticipating a social 
situation, individuals with social anxiety tend to focus on the various possibilities and 
consequences of social failures. This is in line with research that has found that individuals 
with social anxiety report, both before, during, and after social events, more negatively 
distorted images and memories compared with individuals without social anxiety (Chiupka, 
Moscovitch, & Bielak, 2012; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998). 
Another core feature of the model is that socially anxious individuals believe that 
others have extremely high standards of them. It is highly likely that they will fall short of 
these standards, which the individual perceives as having “terrible” consequences. In addition 
to fearing negative evaluation from others, socially anxious individuals can find positive 
evaluation to be anxiety-producing, as it triggers fears that they cannot maintain their 
performance and will eventually fail. Social anxiety is, therefore, triggered when the 
individual observes the discrepancy between their mental representation of themselves and 
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their perception of the audience’s high standards of them (fear of negative evaluation) or they 
fear the consequences of drawing positive attention to themselves (fear of positive 
evaluation). 
Furthermore, the model of Heimberg et al. (2014) emphasised the importance of post-
event processing in which the individual ruminates on past social situations, analysing their 
own behaviour and others’ reactions. In re-processing the memory, it often becomes 
negatively distorted, leading to increased negative affect and fearful anticipation of future 
social events. Finally, Heimburg and colleagues (2014) emphasised the importance of 
emotional dysregulation and reduced emotional expression in social anxiety. Past research 
has found that socially anxious individuals have reduced understanding of their emotions and 
are less expressive of both their positive and negative emotions (Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, 
Moore, & Heimberg, 2007; Mennin, McLaughlin, & Flanagan, 2009). In accordance with 
this, socially anxious individuals are less supportive of their partners’ positive experiences 
(Kashdan, Ferssizidis, Farmer, Adams, & McKnight, 2013) and engage in reduced self-
disclosure (Meleshko & Alden, 1993), resulting in poorer relationship outcomes. This further 
reinforces the belief that others will negatively evaluate them. In addition, Heimburg et al. 
hypothesised that socially anxious individuals engage in reduced emotional expression 
because they believe that showing strong emotions will result in negative social consequences 
(e.g. rejection and judgement). Since socially anxious individuals do not typically test out this 
hypothesis to either refute it or realise that the consequences of emotional expression are not 
catastrophic, their anxiety is maintained.  
Wong and Rapee (2016): Integrated Aetiological and Maintenance (IAM) Model of 
Social Anxiety Disorder  
The models of social anxiety discussed thus far focus predominantly on the cognitive 
maintaining factors of social anxiety. Recently, however, Wong and Rapee (2016) proposed 
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the integrated aetiological and maintenance (IAM) model to provide a conceptualisation of 
both the developmental and maintaining factors of Social Anxiety Disorder. According to the 
IAM model, the threat value that individuals ascribe to social-evaluative stimuli is 
determined by several aetiological factors. In addition, according to the model, functioning is 
guided by an operating system, labelled the social-evaluative threat (SET) principle. 
Expressions of the SET principle vary along a continuum within the population, reflecting the 
level of threat value assigned to social-evaluative stimuli. 
Wong and Rapee (2016) identified five aetiological factors in the IAM model, which 
determine the threat value assigned to social evaluative situations. Firstly, there is a genetic 
factor. Wong and Rapee proposed that an avoidant temperament style in some infants can 
lead them to avoid social-evaluative stimuli, such that they feel uncertain regarding such 
stimuli. In addition, having an aversion to uncertainty, such infants are more likely to judge 
the stimuli as highly threatening. This is in line with the finding that the temperamental factor 
of behavioural inhibition predicts the development of social anxiety (Chronis-Tuscano et al., 
2009; Hudson, Dodd, Lyneham, & Bovopoulous, 2011; Muris, van Brakel, Arntz, & 
Schouten, 2011; Rapee, 2014). 
Secondly, parent behaviours can teach children that social-evaluative stimuli are 
threatening. Examples of this include a parent telling a child that certain social-evaluative 
stimuli are dangerous, encouraging or allowing the child to avoid social-evaluative situations, 
or modelling avoidance of those situations. In addition, research has found that parenting 
styles that are over-controlling or over-protective, insecure parent-child attachment styles, 
and expressed parental anxiety in social situations predict social anxiety (Bar-Haim, Dan, 
Eshel, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2007; Brurnariu & Kerns, 2008; de Rosnay, Cooper, Tsigaras, & 
Murray, 2006; Hane, Cheah, Rubin, & Fox, 2008; Lewis-Morrarty et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
these parent behaviours can interact with the child’s temperament style, as avoidant or 
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inhibited infant temperament styles tend to elicit more protective behaviour from parents 
(Kiff, Lengua, & Zalewski, 2011; Rubin, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009). 
Thirdly, peer interactions that convey negative evaluation, such as teasing, ostracism, 
and bullying, can increase the threat value of social-evaluative stimuli. This is supported by 
research that has found that peer victimisation and low peer acceptance predicts the 
development of social anxiety (Levinson, Langer, & Rodebaugh, 2013; Loukas & Pasch, 
2013; Ranta, Kaltiala-Heino, Frojd, & Marttunen, 2013; Siegel, La Greca, & Harrison, 2009; 
Tillfors, Persson, Willen, & Burk, 2012). 
Fourthly, increased social-evaluative threat can be influenced by the experience of 
stressful or traumatic life events, such as interpersonal conflict, or physical, emotional, or 
sexual abuse. Wong and Rapee (2016) predicted that negative life events will have a greater 
impact on threat value if they are direct rather than indirect, the individual experiences 
multiple life events, and if they occur at particularly sensitive periods in development 
(e.g., early childhood). 
Finally, cultural characteristics can affect the threat value of social-evaluative stimuli. 
For example, Wong and Rapee considered that some cultures can have specific norms, which 
if violated, result in negative evaluation from others. Therefore, these five aetiological factors 
constitute risk factors for increasing the threat value represented in the SET principle. The 
SET principle is then realised by particular neurobiological and cognitive effects. 
Specifically, according to the IAM model, heightened activation of the amygdala is 
associated with social-evaluative situations. In addition, the SET principle is associated with 
negative cognitions regarding the danger of social-evaluative situations. This includes 
negative beliefs about the self, social-evaluative beliefs, social-evaluative imagery, and 
interpretation biases. These aetiological factors are outlined in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Wong and Rapee’s (2016) integrated aetiological and maintenance (IAM) model. 
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As seen in Figure 3, in response to high threat value, cognitive processes emerge that 
increase attention to both the self (e.g., to monitor how one’s performance or appearance may 
be observable to others or detect bodily signals or negative cognitions associated with social-
evaluative threat) and the external environment (e.g., to detect signs of negative evaluation 
from others). In addition, behaviours are undertaken to eliminate social-evaluative threat 
(e.g., avoidance or escape of the situation). These cognitive and behavioural processes can 
lead to performance deficits in social-evaluative situations through anxiety or reduced 
availability of attentional resources to direct to the situation. In addition, avoidance of social 
situations leads to reduced opportunities to develop age-appropriate social skills and 
knowledge. 
Wong and Rapee proposed that these primary cognitive processes lead to secondary 
cognitive processes; namely anticipatory processing and post-event processing. This 
increases the detection of social stimuli that are interpreted as threatening, thus reinforcing 
the high threat value of social-evaluative stimuli. In parallel, secondary attempts to eliminate 
social threat emerge, which include behavioural avoidance (e.g., safety behaviours) and 
cognitive processes (e.g., cognitive avoidance). These processes prevent the individual from 
engaging effectively in social-evaluative situations, tending to lead to actual negative 
evaluation from others and so increasing the threat value associated with the SET principle. 
Due to a high threat value placed on social-evaluative situations, the individual is then likely 
to experience high state anxiety when faced with these situations, thus increasing the 
likelihood of life interference and Social Anxiety Disorder onset. Although some components 
of the IAM model require further empirical validation (e.g., the influences of culture and 
negative life events), this model provides a generally empirically supported and 
comprehensive picture of the development and maintenance of social anxiety.  
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Summary and Links to the Present Thesis 
In addition to providing an overview of social anxiety and its measurement, this 
chapter outlined the three major models of social anxiety relevant to this thesis: Clark and 
Wells’ (1995) cognitive model of social phobia, Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) cognitive-
behavioral model of anxiety in social phobia, and Wong and Rapee’s (2016) IAM model of 
Social Anxiety Disorder. These models provided the groundwork for the research in this 
thesis, as they emphasised the importance of cognitive factors in maintaining social anxiety, 
as well as potentially playing a causal role, and proposed that biased allocation of attention to 
threat is a major contributing factor to symptoms of social anxiety. 
Interestingly, Clarke and Wells (1995) proposed that this effect occurs through self-
focussed attention to physical sensations and anxious thoughts. Although there has been 
considerable support for the role of self-focussed attention in socially anxiety 
(e.g., Gaydukevych & Kocovski, 2012; Glick & Orsillo, 2011; Hodson, McManus, Clark, & 
Doll, 2008), Clark and Wells’ (1995) model overlooked the role of biased visual attention to 
threat. However, this factor is important. In line with Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) and 
Wong and Rapee’s (2016) predictions, studies indicate that social anxiety is associated with 
biased visual attention to threatening words, facial expressions, and body language 
(e.g., Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003; Grafton & MacLeod, 2016; Lin, Hofmann, 
Qian, Kind, & Yu, 2016; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004). However, Rapee and Heimberg 
and Wong and Rapee’s models have limitations in that they do not provide more specific 
predictions regarding when enhanced attention and delayed disengagement with threat may 
occur or the role of attentional avoidance from threat. The current thesis aimed to deepen our 
understanding of the mechanisms that result in biased attention to threat.  
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Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of visual attention, discussing how visual attention 
is a selective process that enhances the processing of some visual information at the expense 
of other information. This chapter then explores different types of attention as well as the 
relative roles of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history in orienting to 
features in our visual environment. As visual attention has been extensively researched for 
many decades, this chapter is not intended to provide a complete discussion of the field. This 
chapter, therefore, focuses on overviewing visual attention to provide the core knowledge 
required to understand the visual attention mechanisms relevant to this thesis. Note that a 
discussion of temporal attention, which is a form of visual attention, is included in Chapter 
Nine when considering directions for further research.  
Overview of Attention 
Despite the maxim by William James that “Everyone knows what attention is” 
(James, 1890, p. 381), there has been ongoing confusion and debate regarding its definition. 
A recent taxonomy by Chun, Golomb, and Turk-Browne (2011) proposed that the function of 
attention is to select, modulate, and sustain focus on information to guide behavior. Attention 
is, therefore, needed to select relevant information and ignore irrelevant information. A broad 
distinction in the attention literature has been made between external and internal attention 
(Chun et al., 2011). More specifically, external attention, also known as perceptual attention, 
refers to the selection and modulation of sensory information (e.g., from vision, hearing, 
touch, smell, and taste). By contrast, internal attention refers to the selection and modulation 
of internal sources of information, such as working memory, long-term memory, task sets, 
and response selection (see Chun et al., 2011, for a discussion). However, biases in visual 
attention, which falls within the category of external attention, is theorised to be particularly 
relevant to social anxiety and is explored in detail in this chapter.  
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Attention as a Selective Process 
Attention is a limited-resource system in which visual stimuli compete for cortical 
representation (Broadbent, 1958; Neisser, 1967; Treisman, 1960). During waking life, we are 
bombarded with visual information, yet there is a finite amount of capacity available in the 
brain, which places restrictions on any person’s ability to process visual information (Clarke 
& Sokoloff, 1994; Lennie, 2003). Since we cannot process all available information, a 
selection process is necessary to determine what information is to be prioritised for further 
processing, versus delaying or ignoring information. According to the biased-competition 
theory, when multiple stimuli appear in the visual field, the stimuli are not processed 
independently but instead they activate populations of neurons that interact in a competitive 
manner. Specifically, both single-cell and neuroimaging studies have found that when 
multiple stimuli are presented in the same receptive field, they are processed in a mutually 
suppressive manner (see Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Research has compared neural 
responses in the monkey brain when one stimulus is presented compared with two 
simultaneously presented stimuli, finding that simultaneous presentations resulted in neural 
responses that were a weighted average of the response to one stimulus (Reynolds, Chelazzi, 
& Desimone, 1999). 
To understand how we prioritise some visual information above other information, a 
“spotlight” has been employed as a metaphor of visual selection, suggesting that attention is 
shifted from object to object resulting in enhanced processing within a selected location in 
space (Posner, 1980). This model facilitates our understanding of the limited capacity nature 
of selective attention. Only a small amount of visual information can receive high-level 
processing at any one time and this relevant information is selected in our visual field so as to 
best guide our behaviour. Yet, although this spotlight metaphor helps to understand how we 
attend to specific stimuli (e.g., when reading a book), it does not describe the ability to attend 
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to multiple stimuli in a visual field at once (e.g., when monitoring both the ball and other 
players during a game of soccer). To account for these types of flexible attentional strategies, 
the attentional zoom-lens model was developed. This model posited that the size of the 
attentional focus can be varied continuously (Eriksen & St. James, 1986; LaBerge & Brown, 
1989; Müller, Bartelt, Donner, Villringer, & Brandt, 2003). Processing is still selective and 
capacity-limited, however, a trade-off between the size of the attended area and resolution of 
processing occurs. Thus, attention can either be focussed on a small visual location, leading 
to detailed focussed processing, or spread more broadly throughout a visual field with a 
corresponding loss of spatial resolution and processing efficiency (Castiello & Umiltá, 1992; 
Castiello & Umiltà, 1990; Eriksen & St. James, 1986). However, there are limitations to the 
spotlight and zoom-lens metaphors. For instance, they do not explain the fact that humans can 
allocate attention to non-contiguous areas (e.g., an annulus, see Jefferies & Di Lollo, 2015), 
and the fact that attention appears to have a gradual gradient rather than a hard edge (White, 
Ratcliff, & Starns, 2011). Although the spotlight and zoom-lens metaphors are helpful to 
understand space-based attention, attention can also be deployed to features and objects in the 
visual field. These separate types of attention are discussed more in the next section.  
Types of Attention 
Three main types of visual attention have been identified: (1) spatial attention, in 
which attention is shifted to a particular location in space, either overtly, with accompanying 
eye movements, or covertly, without accompanying eye movements; (2) feature-based 
attention in which overt or covert attentional orienting occurs based on stimulus features 
(e.g., colour, motion, or orientation) regardless of the location of the stimulus; and (3) object-
based attention in which overt or covert attentional orienting is deployed by object structure 
(Carrasco, 2011). 
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An early demonstration of spatial attentional orienting comes from Posner’s cueing 
paradigm (Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984) in which a target was presented in one of 
two locations and participants responded to whether the target was present or not. An initial 
cue (e.g., an arrow) was presented to indicate the probable location of the target. Typically, 
faster reaction times (RTs) have been found in the cued, relative to the opposite (uncued) 
location, suggesting that attention was oriented toward that location (Posner, 1980; Posner & 
Cohen, 1984). Space-based attention, therefore, reflects our ability to move attention, like a 
beam of light, across our visual field; enhancing processing in the location that attention falls 
upon (e.g., when scanning the names of books on a library shelf or looking through clothes 
on a rack). 
Although vision research has largely focussed on the effects of shifting attention 
between particular locations in the visual field, attention can also be guided by particular 
visual features, such as orientation, colour, or direction of motion (Boynton, 2009; Haenny, 
Maunsell, & Schiller, 1988; Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004; Maunsell & Treue, 2006; 
Treue & Trujillo, 1999). In cluttered scenes, feature-based attention can be used to orient 
quickly to objects when its feature is known but not its location. For example, when 
searching for a friend in a crowd, knowing that they are wearing red allows for selective 
attention toward red objects. Research has found that feature-based attention can select 
features within a particular dimension (e.g., red or blue objects, upward or downward motion, 
and vertical or horizontal orientation; Baldassi & Verghese, 2005; Haenny et al., 1988; 
Lankheet & Verstraten, 1995; Ling, Liu, & Carrasco, 2009; Liu, Larsson, & Carrasco, 2007; 
Liu, Stevens, & Carrasco, 2007; Martinez-Trujillo & Treue, 2004; Muller et al., 2006; Saenz, 
Buracas, & Boynton, 2003), as well as orient to particular dimensions of features 
(e.g., motion or orientation; Chawla, Rees, & Friston, 1999; Liu, Slotnick, Serences, & 
Yantis, 2003). In addition, feature-based attention is not constrained to the location of stimuli 
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that is being attended but is, instead, spread throughout space (e.g., Boynton, Ciaramitaro, & 
Arman, 2006; Felisberti & Zanker, 2005; Hayden & Gallant, 2005; Liu & Mance, 2011; 
McAdams & Maunsell, 2000; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton, 2002, 2003). For example, 
McAdams and Maunsell (2000) measured neuronal responses in the V4 area of the cortex of 
monkeys whilst they performed a visual task. The responses of most V4 neurons were 
affected by whether the monkeys were attending to the orientation or colour of a stimulus, 
even when the stimulus fell outside of the neuron’s receptive field. These results demonstrate 
that attentional selection is not only based on spatial location, but also involves searching for 
a particular feature triggering changed neural activity throughout the visual field. 
Finally, rather than shifting attention to spatial locations or features, a third category 
of attention has been recognised; object-based attention. In this type of attentional selection 
process, all parts of an object may be selected and processed concurrently. This allows us, for 
example, to easily attend to a dog at a dog-park, even though it may run behind other dogs 
and rapidly change direction. Object-based attention was demonstrated by Egly, Driver, and 
Rafal (1994) in a cueing paradigm. In this experiment, cueing one end of a rectangle resulted 
in improved performance at the other end of the rectangle compared with performance to a 
target at an equally distant location that was in a separate rectangle. Further evidence is that 
individuals can engage in tracking multiple moving objects across a scene (Sears & Pylyshyn, 
2000), and can attend to one of two objects even though they share the same location (Blaser, 
Pylyshyn, & Holcombe, 2000). 
Although attention to space, features, and objects have been differentiated in the 
literature, evidence indicates that attentional selection can result from interactions between 
them (Kravitz & Behrmann, 2011; Leonard, Balestreri, & Luck, 2015). For example, Leonard 
et al. (2015) found that the impact of distractors on feature-based attentional capture effects 
increased when the distractors where closer to the location of focussed spatial attention. This 
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indicates that feature-based attention is modulated by spatial attention. A further difficulty of 
these categories is differentiating features and objects from one another. That is, attention can 
be deployed to both parts of objects (Vecera, Behrmann, & Filapek, 2001) as well as global 
representations of objects (Yeari & Goldsmith, 2011). So, for example, when looking at a 
nose on a face, should that be considered a feature or an object in its own right? Thus, in real-
world visual processing, space-, feature-, and object-based attention may flexibly interact, 
resulting in enhanced processing of particular objects or features and provide scene-wide 
representations of our visual world. 
Attentional Selection by Top-Down, Bottom-Up, and Selection History Mechanisms 
The selection of visual stimuli by attention can be driven by three mechanisms: top-
down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history. More specifically, when 
navigating our visual world, we may use volitional, top-down attention to search for our keys, 
a friend in a crowd, or a particular piece of fruit in a supermarket. However, we may also 
attend to objects that we did not intend to look for. That is, stimulus-driven, bottom-up 
attention allows us to orient to objects such as a swooping bird, the flashing lights of a fire 
truck, or an unexpected ball thrown at us (see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). More recently, a 
third mechanism of attention has also been recognised: selection history (Awh, Belopolsky, 
& Theeuwes, 2012). Selection history refers to the capture of attention by a visual stimulus 
due to past selection or past reward history, even if it no longer matches the individual’s top-
down goals. For example, after finding your keys using top-down attention, another irrelevant 
key may capture your attention even though you were no longer searching for it. Each of 
these mechanisms of attention will be discussed in more detail below. 
Bottom-Up Attention  
A common conceptualisation of attentional selection is that preferential attention is 
directed toward the most salient visual stimuli, locations, or visual features that evoke the 
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strongest neural response within the visual field (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Koch & 
Ullman, 1985). It has been theorised that an early topographical map of the visual 
environment is encoded in a bottom-up manner based on features such as colour, motion, and 
orientation. This is fed to a “saliency map”, that prioritises the most conspicuous or 
interesting stimuli in the visual scene. Attention is then oriented to the spot on the map with 
the highest saliency (Koch & Ullman, 1985). 
The neural basis of bottom-up attention is initiated from the primary visual cortex 
(V1), ascending into multiple visual areas and then separating into the ventral pathway 
focussed on object- and feature-based attentional processing, and a dorsal pathway focussed 
on movement- and space-based processing (Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994; Ungerleider & 
Mishkin, 1982). Components of the ventral pathway include V1, V2, V3, V4, and the inferior 
temporal (IT) cortex that then projects to the ventral part of the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(PFC). Components of the dorsal pathway are V1, V2, V3, middle temporal (MT) area, and 
medial superior temporal (MST) area and areas within the posterior parietal cortex (PPC), 
which project to the dorsolateral part of the PFC (dlPFC) (see Katsuki & Constantinidis, 
2014). Processing along these pathways is hierarchal, with each stage building upon the 
previous stage to form more complex representations of the visual field.  
Top-Down Attention  
In addition to bottom-up attentional capture based on stimulus salience, it has long 
been recognised that attentional orienting can also depend on current goals (Wolfe, 1994). 
That is, visual processing is not solely determined by feedforward processing from lower to 
higher visual cortical areas. Instead, neural tuning can be impacted by feedback mechanisms 
from higher areas of the cortex (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000). For example, neurons in V1 
can change their tuning for orientation (Ringach, Hawken, & Shapley, 1997) and colour 
(Cottaris & De Valois, 1998) over the course of their responses. This research provides initial 
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evidence that top-down attentional processing influences attentional selection by feedback 
mechanisms. 
It has been proposed that the attentional system includes a “priority map”, which 
integrates input from bottom-up and top-down factors (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Serences & 
Yantis, 2006). Indeed, facilitated behavioural and neuronal responses have been found based 
on top-down cues to particular spatial locations and stimulus features (e.g., colour) (Corbetta, 
Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1990; Heinze et al., 1994; Hillyard & Munte, 1984; 
Kingstone, 1992; Posner, 1980; Vanvoorhis & Hillyard, 1977; Woldorff et al., 1997). More 
specifically, top-down attention results in enhanced neural activity for the target location, 
feature, or object, while neural activity for irrelevant stimuli is supressed. This process has 
been associated with areas within the dorsal and ventral pathways, including V1, V2, V4, IT, 
MT, the PPC, and the PFC (Noudoost, Chang, Steinmetz, & Moore, 2010). However, the 
origin of top-down attentional signals has been linked to the PFC and PPC (see Katsuki & 
Constantinidis, 2014). For example, microstimulation of the frontal eye field (FEF), located 
in the PFC, has been found to result in an enhanced firing rate in visual areas and improved 
performance on visual attention tasks (Moore & Armstrong, 2003; Moore & Fallah, 2001, 
2004). Conversely, inactivation of the FEF using microinjections of muscimol, which causes 
suppression of neurophysiological activity, resulted in performance deficits on visual 
attention tasks (Wardak, Ibos, Duhamel, & Olivier, 2006). It is, therefore, thought that top-
down attentional selection is driven by feedback projections from the PFC and PPC to the 
visual cortex (see Figure 4). Consistent with this, Ninomiya, Sawamura, Inoue, and Takada 
(2012) found that segregated pathways link areas of the PFC and PPC to specific areas within 
the dorsal and ventral streams. Research investigating the neural systems associated with top-
down and bottom-up attention indicates that overlapping brain areas are involved in both 
attentional systems (e.g., the PFC and PPC). However, despite this overlap in neural activity, 
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research has found that top-down and bottom-up attention have distinct processes, which 
provide a priority map for the selection of visual stimuli (Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Top-down and bottom-up attentional processing in the human brain (Sinke, 
Neufeld, Zedler, & Emrich, 2014). 
Feature-based top-down control of attention has been demonstrated in the research of 
contingent capture theory. According to contingent capture theory, bottom-up visual cues will 
only capture spatial attention if they match the top-down attentional set of the participant. In a 
study demonstrating this, Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) presented participants with a 
visual task in which they reported the presence of an “X” or “+” in an array. On each trial, the 
target was defined by its onset (the appearance of a single target) or its colour (red amongst 
white distractors). On some trials, a cue (four dots surrounding a placeholder) preceded the 
target and was also defined by onset or colour. Folk et al. (1992) found that valid cues, which 
signalled the correct location of the to-be-presented target, resulted in faster responding to the 
target, and invalid cues, which signalled an incorrect location, resulted in slowed responding. 
This well-studied phenomenon is typically known as a cueing effect. However, cueing only 
occurred if the cue matched the properties of the target. Therefore, when the target was 
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defined by onset, onset cues affected performance, and when the target was defined by 
colour, colour cues affected performance. By contrast, when the properties of the cue did not 
match the target, participants’ attention was not captured by the cue. This indicates that 
salient stimuli do not always capture attention. Instead, attentional orienting is dependent on 
top-down control settings. This finding has been confirmed by decades of research on 
contingent capture (for a review, see Folk & Remington, 2010). 
Further research examining the distinction between bottom-up and top-down attention 
demonstrated that target stimuli will “pop-out” of a visual display in a bottom-up manner if 
they differ substantially from distractors (e.g., a red stimulus amongst green distractors) 
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Treisman, 1985; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). 
However, if the target stimulus does not differ substantially from distractors, it can be 
identified using top-down attention by searching each stimulus within the visual field, one-
by-one (Wolfe & Horowitz, 2004). This research indicates that bottom-up attentional capture 
should be invariant to task demands, whereas top-down attention is affected by task demands 
(e.g., the number of stimuli in an array). 
In addition to pop-out effects, a further distinction between top-down and bottom-up 
attention is the involvement of working-memory (WM) resources. WM is a limited-capacity 
system and is responsible for the active maintenance of information, particularly the storage 
and rehearsal of information and executive functions (Conway et al., 2005). Indeed, WM can 
be thought of as synonymous with cognitive control (i.e., top-down attention) (Qi et al., 
2014). Since bottom-up attention places few demands on WM resources, it is relatively 
unaffected by WM load (Jonides, 1981). By contrast, top-down attention requires WM 
resources (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Downing, 2000). Therefore, if a high WM 
load (e.g., remembering a digit string or solving an arithmetic task) is added to a visual 
attentional task, participants will have limited top-down resources available to perform the 
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visual attentional task. Hence, if performance is unaffected by the WM load, it can be 
concluded that this task is driven by bottom-up attention. By contrast, if performance is 
impaired by the addition of high WM load, this reveals that top-down attention is required to 
perform the task (see Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002). That is, top-down 
attention is characterised by the goals of the individual and requires WM resources, whereas 
bottom-up attention occurs relatively automatically and depends on stimuli salience.  
Selection History  
The theory of a dichotomy between top-down attention and bottom-up attention, 
while long-standing in cognitive psychology, has been criticised for not accounting for 
selection history (Awh et al., 2012). Selection history recognises that visual attentional 
capture can occur based on an individual’s past selection and reward history (Awh et al., 
2012). In an early demonstration of selection history, Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) 
conducted a pop-out visual search experiment in which participants showed speeded 
responses to a target defined by colour or spatial frequency cues. Faster RTs were found 
when the same target repeated across two trials, compared with when it switched. In fact, this 
speeding of responses occurred even when participants knew with 100% certainty the identity 
of the target on the upcoming trial, indicating that selection history can guide attention even 
when it differs from one’s current goal (Belopolsky & Awh, 2016; Theeuwes, Reimann, & 
Mortier, 2006; Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2013).Extending on this work, Theeuwes (2013) 
argued that the contingent capture effects found in past research can be explained entirely by 
selection history (referred to by Theeuwes as “bottom-up priming”). This is because, 
previously, contingent capture paradigm experiments employed blocked designs in which 
participants were asked to search for the same stimulus feature throughout an entire block of 
trials. Thus top-down attention was confounded with selection history effects. In particular, in 
Experiment 2 of their article, Theeuwes et al. (2006) demonstrated that controlling for 
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selection history as a factor can eliminate the pattern of results that would typically be 
interpreted as top-down effects. In this experiment, participants searched for a singleton 
(diamond or red circle) after seeing a cue. This cue could indicate the probable identity of the 
singleton (“shape” or “colour”) or was a neutral cue that did not predict the target’s identity 
(“equal”). The predictive cue trials and neutral trials were blocked. In addition, to prevent 
response priming, participants did not respond to the singleton itself, but instead reported the 
orientation of a line that was presented inside the singleton. In this study, no cueing effects 
were found, as foreknowledge about the singleton’s identity did not facilitate performance. 
Theeuwes et al. (2006) concluded that top-down feature cues cannot be used to guide 
attention to a target and, instead, cueing effects are driven by selection history. 
However, contrary to the assertions made by Theeuwes (2013) and Theeuwes et al. 
(2006), other research indicates that goal-driven, top-down attention can be used to guide 
selective attention (Belopolsky & Awh, 2016; Chen & Cave, 2015). For instance, Belopolsky 
and Awh (2016) hypothesised that participants will not employ top-down attentional 
guidance for pop-out arrays because search can be easily guided by bottom-up attention. 
However, in more difficult arrays when stimulus features do not pop-out, top-down, feature-
based guidance of attention will be employed. Indeed, that is what these researchers found. 
Belopolsky and Awh (2016) employed two conditions, one in which the target circle was a 
unique colour to the distractor (pop-out condition) and one in which the target circle and 
distractors were all presented in different colours (heterogeneous condition). When the pop-
out trials were blocked, there was no effect of cueing. By contrast, in the heterogeneous 
condition, and in a second experiment in which heterogeneous and pop-out trials were 
intermixed in a condition, cueing was found. This indicates that top-down, feature-based 
attention can be used to guide early attention, but it is only employed when it is helpful to the 
task. Furthermore, although it is likely that different attentional mechanisms interact to guide 
51 
 
attention (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Serences & Yantis, 2006), top-down attention, bottom-
up attention, and selection history have separate and distinguishable contributions to visual 
attention. 
Summary and Links to the Present Thesis 
This chapter provided an overview of basic visual attention, outlining that attention is 
a selective process and can be guided to spatial locations, features, and objects. Furthermore, 
attentional guidance can be driven by top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection 
history. Although there is a body of research exploring the relative roles of top-down 
attention, bottom-up attention, and selection history toward basic stimuli, such as shapes and 
colours, the roles of all three of these attentional processes have not been systematically 
explored in relation to either emotional faces or social anxiety. This is surprising, given that 
this framework is core to cognitive psychologists’ understanding of how attentional orienting 
works, and the fact that there is broad interest in attention to emotional faces. This theoretical 
framework has significantly elucidated our understanding of attentional orienting to basic 
features and, therefore, it holds much promise in improving our understanding of attentional 
orienting to complex properties such as threat. Furthermore, the bias to threatening facial 
expressions associated with social anxiety has considerable clinical significance, yet it has 
not always enjoyed the same strong theoretical basis as visual-attention research in cognitive 
psychology. The research in this thesis rectifies this via applying this fundamental framework 
to elucidate our understanding of the mechanisms underlying biased attention to threat in 
social anxiety. The next chapter discusses how the threat bias and these attentional processes 
can be tested to further understand social anxiety symptomatology.  
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Chapter Overview 
Theoretical models indicate that a critical maintaining factor for social anxiety is 
selective attention to threat, such as socially threatening words (e.g., “stupid”, “ugly”) or 
faces (e.g., those displaying expressions of anger, disgust, or contempt) (Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997; Wong & Rapee, 2016). The current thesis focussed specifically on visual attention to 
faces as, arguably, faces are more ecologically valid than words as they represent the main 
threats faced in daily social interactions (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001). A body of research 
has emerged attempting to determine the exact nature of this bias and how it can be best 
measured. In this chapter, the components of the attentional bias are discussed, examining the 
research findings for biases in first the initial engagement with threat, then delayed 
disengagement from threat, and finally avoidance of threat. This chapter then outlines the 
primary techniques for measuring this bias. An overview of attention bias modification is 
then provided. Finally, the contributions of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and 
selection history to the threat bias are explored.  
Components of Attentional Biases 
Unsurprisingly, due to the multifaceted nature of attention, a large body of literature 
has developed with differing methods for how to both conceptualise and measure attentional 
biases. Within visual attention, Posner and Petersen (1990; see Petersen and Posner, 2012 for 
an updated model) proposed that three relatively separate attentional networks are responsible 
for alerting, orienting, and executive control. More specifically, the alerting network is 
responsible for maintaining vigilance during a task. For example, a warning signal prior to 
the onset of a target can result in faster target detection, even though the warning did not 
provide additional information about the target (e.g., location). The orienting network is 
responsible for selecting the modality or target location, and the executive is responsible for 
target detection and conflict resolution. The Attention Network Task has been developed to 
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measure these three networks (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). Threat-
related biases in visual attention have largely focused on the orienting network of visual 
attention specifically. Within the orienting function, attention to threat may be comprised of 
facilitated attention to threat, delayed disengagement from threat, and/or attentional 
avoidance of threat (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006; Koster, 
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; for a 
review, see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Facilitated attention to threat refers to the enhanced 
likelihood or speed of orienting attention toward a threatening stimulus. Difficulty 
disengaging from threat refers to the speed or ease of shifting attention away from a 
threatening stimulus toward another stimulus. Finally, avoidance of threat refers to the 
situation in which attention is preferentially allocated to the location opposite to the location 
of the threatening stimulus. 
According to the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (Mogg, Bradley et al., 2004), 
anxious individuals demonstrate initial vigilance for threat, followed by avoidance of threat. 
This suggests a temporal relationship between the components of facilitated attention and 
avoidance. Though not included in the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis, a third potential 
mechanism of the threat bias is delayed disengagement from threat. The recognition that there 
are several separate components of the attention process demonstrates the importance of 
separately measuring them and considering the time course of facilitated attention to threat, 
delayed disengagement from threat, and avoidance. Below, I review the evidence for biases 
toward threat for individuals with high social anxiety.  
Measurement of Attentional Biases 
The Stroop Task  
Initial studies assessing the threat bias utilised the Stroop task. In a typical Stroop 
task, participants are asked to respond to the colour of a projected word, where the meaning 
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of the word is irrelevant. Faster RTs are typically found when the word colour and meaning 
match (e.g., when the word “YELLOW” is written in yellow) compared with when they are 
incongruent (e.g., “YELLOW” is written in blue). This paradigm reveals participants’ failure 
to ignore the word meaning. An emotional Stroop paradigm is a modified form of the 
classical Stroop test and is designed to measure attentional biases to emotional stimuli, such 
as threatening words. Research has found that socially anxious individuals demonstrate 
slower RTs for colour-naming of socially threatening words (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & 
Roth, 2001; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, 
& Brystritsky, 1996; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993). It was initially concluded that these 
slowed RTs reflect enhanced allocation of attention to threatening words for socially anxious 
individuals. However, other possibilities are that socially anxious individuals process both the 
neutral and threatening words equally but the presence of threat words results in a more 
negative affective state which slows RT (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), or, that socially 
anxious individuals actually display emotional avoidance of the threatening words and the 
slower RTs are due to increased effort or time needed in the stage of initially avoiding 
processing the threatening words (de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). Furthermore, the Stroop task 
tests participants’ attention to a threatening stimulus at a centrally-located position. Since 
participants are instructed to orient to this location throughout the trial, the Stroop task cannot 
assess the separate components of attention of facilitated engagement, delayed 
disengagement, and avoidance of threat. These limitations are addressed by the visual search 
task and the dot-probe task which, by contrast, measures participants’ ability to orient their 
attention through space.  
The Visual Search Task  
In the visual search task (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Rinck, Becker, Kellermann, 
& Roth, 2003), participants are directed to search for a target stimulus that is embedded in a 
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matrix of distracting stimuli (e.g., an angry face amongst neutral faces), and make some type 
of prescribed response regarding the target (e.g., detect the presence or absence of the target 
on each trial). Increased engagement with threat is defined as faster RTs to a threatening 
target stimulus appearing amongst neutral stimuli compared with a neutral target stimulus 
amongst neutral distractors. By comparison, a disengagement bias is reflected by slower RTs 
to a neutral target stimulus presented amongst threatening distractors compared with a neutral 
target stimulus amongst neutral distractors. In a visual search task, also known as a “face-in-
the-crowd” paradigm, Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, and Amir (1999) presented participants with 
12 photographs of faces. On each trial, these photographs either consisted of all the same 
emotional expression (happy, angry, neutral, or disgusted), or one photograph depicted a 
different expression to the other 11 photographs. Participants responded to whether there was 
an odd-one-out or not on each trial. Gilboa-Schechtman et al. (1999) found that all 
participants had faster RTs to the angry face compared with the happy face amongst neutral 
distractors. This difference in RT was larger for socially anxious individuals than for non-
anxious controls, which they concluded reflects a threat bias. However, inconsistent results 
have been found. For instance, Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, and Öhman (2005) reported the 
opposite finding that happy faces were detected more rapidly than angry faces, and that social 
anxiety was not associated with different RTs. Further research has also found that, with a 
non-clinical sample, faster detection of happy or angry face advantages was dependent on the 
type of face database employed (Savage, Lipp, Craig, Becker, & Horstmann, 2013). This 
indicates that the results of visual search tasks are easily influenced by low-level perceptual 
differences across faces in different databases. In addition to inconsistent results, the visual 
search task approach has been criticised for possibly confounding early attentional processes 
with later processes, such as the judgement and interpretation of stimuli (Staugaard, 2010). 
Another potential deficiency for some of the visual search research is that it has not 
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sufficiently considered the role of the distractor context (Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 
2008). For example, it is difficult to draw conclusions about performance across conditions 
with differing distractor backgrounds (e.g., searching for an angry face amongst happy 
distractors versus a happy face amongst angry distractors), as results could reflect enhanced 
attentional orienting to the target stimulus or differential dwell time or rejection of the 
distractor stimuli.  
The Dot-Probe Task  
In the dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986), participants are simultaneously 
presented with two visual stimuli (e.g., two words or images) either on the top and bottom or 
left and right of the computer screen. In the first development of the task (MacLeod et al., 
1986), participants were asked to read the top word aloud. The two words were presented for 
500ms and then a probe (“*”) was presented in the locus of one of the words and participants 
were asked to respond to the presentation of the probe as quickly as possible. More recent 
dot-probe paradigms (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Mogg & Bradley, 
1999; Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007) 
have typically included a central fixation cross, before two stimuli (e.g., one threatening and 
one neutral) are presented and a probe replaces one of the images. Participants are usually 
asked to respond to the presence or identity of the probe. Faster RTs to the probe presented in 
the locus of a threatening word or image compared with a neutral word or image indicate a 
threat bias and are believed to reflect greater engagement of attention to the threatening 
image. Research has typically found that social anxiety is associated with enhanced attention 
to angry faces relative to neutral and happy faces (Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; 
Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004). However, the dot-probe task has also found some 
inconsistent results. For example, when faces were paired with household objects, socially 
anxious participants had a bias away from faces, regardless of the emotion (Chen, Ehlers, 
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Clark, & Mansell, 2002) and when long presentation times for faces were used (1000ms), no 
evidence of a threat bias was found (Gotlib et al., 2004). Also, no biases toward threatening 
faces for socially anxious individuals were found by Bradley et al. (1997) and Pineles and 
Mineka (2005). 
One potential reason for the inconsistent results is that the dot-probe task does not 
differentiate enhanced engagement with threat and difficulty disengaging from threat. Koster 
et al. (2004) attempted to separately measure these two biases with a modified dot-probe task. 
Trials consisted of either threat-neutral or neutral-neutral stimuli. Enhanced engagement with 
threat was reflected by faster RTs to the probe following the threatening image compared 
with RTs to the probe on neutral-neutral trials. By comparison, difficulty disengaging from 
threat was reflected by slower RTs to the neutral image on neutral-threat trials compared with 
RTs on neutral-neutral trials. One issue with this design, though, is that the analysis of 
disengagement trials assumed that all participants first engaged with threat to an equal 
degree. However, since anxious individuals may have an engagement bias as well as delayed 
disengagement from threat, it is important to separately measure these two effects so as not to 
confound them. 
A variation of the dot-probe task has subsequently been developed to overcome this 
problem (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky, Basanovic, & MacLeod, 2014). In this 
design, on each trial participants viewed a target image (a threatening or neutral scene) paired 
with a non-representational image (abstract art) and participants’ shifts of attention toward 
and away from the location of the target image were measured. Specifically, these researchers 
presented an initial cue (a small red line oriented horizontally or vertically) before the 
presentation of the faces. This cue was presented either on the left or right side of the screen 
to secure participants’ attention in the same location or opposite location to the target image. 
A disengagement trial was defined as a trial in which the target image was presented in the 
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same location as the preceding cue, as this meant that participants had to disengage their 
attention from the target to respond to a subsequent probe in the distal location. An 
engagement trial, by contrast, was defined as a trial in which the target was presented in the 
opposite location to the preceding cue, as these trials measured whether participants shifted 
their attention toward the target. After the cue and faces were presented, a probe (similar in 
appearance to the cue) was presented in the locus of one of the faces and participants were 
asked to indicate whether the probe was the same or a different orientation to the cue. On 
50% of trials, the probe appeared in the distal location to the target face and on 50% of trials, 
it appeared in the proximal location. Therefore, for engagement trials, faster RTs in the 
proximal probe position compared with the distal position, indicated that participants shifted 
their attention toward the target face. Importantly, these distal-proximal probe difference 
scores were compared between trials in which the target image was negative compared with 
when it was neutral, to measure if greater engagement toward threat occurred for anxious 
participants. Similarly, difference scores were used to measure the disengagement bias to test 
whether participants had greater difficulty shifting away from the target image and 
responding to the distally presented probe, compared with the proximal probe, when a 
negative target image was used compared with a neutral target image (Rudaizky et al., 2014). 
Both Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. (2014) found that high trait anxious 
participants, compared with low trait anxious participants, had enhanced engagement biases 
and delayed disengagement biases for threat. 
A recent study employed a similar design to measure engagement and disengagement 
biases for participants with low and high social anxiety (Grafton & MacLeod, 2016). Rather 
than using non-representational images, Grafton and MacLeod (2016) directly paired a 
negative and a neutral face on each trial. These researchers found that participants with high 
social anxiety had a greater engagement bias toward negative facial expressions compared 
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with participants with low social anxiety. Social anxiety was not found to be associated with 
difficulties disengaging from threat. The use of this design marks an important development 
in the measure of threat biases as it provides a separate measure of engagement and 
disengagement biases. In addition, initial evidence indicates that social anxiety is 
characterised by enhanced engagement but not delayed disengagement from threat.  
Attention Bias Modification 
Since an attentional bias to threat is conceptualized as a maintaining factor for social 
anxiety, a growing body of research has attempted to develop therapeutic strategies and 
techniques to reduce this bias and, thus, reduce symptoms of social anxiety. This is known as 
attention bias modification (ABM; for a review, see Heeren, Mogoase, Philippot, & McNally, 
2015). The most common method is a variant of the visual dot-probe task, in which probes 
nearly always (e.g., 95% of trials) follow non-threatening stimuli (e.g., neutral or happy 
faces). This task is designed to train individuals’ attention away from threatening stimuli 
(e.g., angry or disgust faces) and, instead, toward neutral or positive stimuli. Although some 
studies have found that ABM results in reduced social anxiety (Amir et al., 2009; Amir, 
Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Heeren, Reese, McNally, & Philippot, 2012; Li, 
Tan, Qian, & Liu, 2008; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009), these results have not 
been replicated by other studies (Boettcher, Berger, & Renneberg, 2012; Boettcher et al., 
2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; Heeren, Lievens, & Philippot, 2011; Julian, Beard, Schmidt, 
Powers, & Smits, 2012; McNally, Enock, Tsai, & Tousian, 2013). In fact, Boettcher et al. 
(2013) found that participants trained to attend to threat had the greatest improvements in 
social anxiety symptoms compared with the attend-positive and control condition, and 
Klumpp and Amir (2010) found that both attend-negative and attend-neutral conditions 
resulted in reductions in anxiety compared with a control condition. These mixed findings 
highlight the fact that the underlying mechanisms of this anxiety-related threat bias are not 
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well understood. The purpose of the current thesis was, therefore, to understand the 
foundations of visual attention to threat associated with social anxiety. A better understanding 
of the bias can then guide techniques to ameliorate it and reduce social anxiety symptoms.    
Mechanisms of the Threat Bias 
Great strides in understanding the clinical significance of the threat bias in social 
anxiety have been made. However, the underlying mechanisms are not well understood. A 
particularly important issue is that it is not known whether these processes are driven by top-
down attention, bottom-up attention, or selection history. In the literature review below, I 
consider four competing possibilities: (1) the threat bias is purely bottom-up in nature, (2) the 
bias is bottom-up but can be modulated by top-down attention, (3) the threat bias is largely 
driven by top-down attention, and (4) the bias is largely driven by selection history. Due to 
the limited research exploring these four possibilities in relation to social anxiety, the 
summary of research below also investigates attention to threat in the general population and 
threat biases for other anxiety disorders.   
Is the Threat Bias Driven by Bottom-Up Attention?  
The dominant view in the literature is that bottom-up threat detection has evolved due 
to its adaptive value (Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller, 2010; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; LeDoux, 1996; LoBue, Rakison, & DeLoache, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Öhman, 2007). This makes good intuitive sense, since being able to rapidly 
attend to threat and respond (e.g., a fight or flight response) has a survival benefit (Pratto & 
John, 1991). Consistent with this perspective, research has found that humans have biases 
toward low-level perceptual features associated with threatening images (LoBue, 2014; 
LoBue & DeLoache, 2011; LoBue & Larson, 2010). 
In support of this, using a visual search task, LoBue (2014) found that participants 
responded more rapidly to simple curvilinear shapes compared with similar rectilinear 
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shapes. LoBue argued that a bias toward curvilinear shapes facilitates the detection of stimuli 
such as snakes, as well as spiders due to their curved legs, above the detection of other 
animals such as frogs or caterpillars. The detection of threat-relevant, low-level perceptual 
features is also enhanced by level of anxiety. For example, the curvilinear shape bias 
increased after participants watched a fearful film clip (LoBue, 2014). Similarly, both child 
and adult populations have been found to have biases toward angry face features 
(e.g., downward “V” shape of the brows) (LoBue & Larson, 2010), indicating that angry 
faces may be detected in a bottom-up manner. This research indicates that there may be a 
bottom-up feature- or object-based attentional system that guides attention to threat-relevant 
stimuli. 
Nevertheless, the exact nature of the stimuli driving this bias is unknown, as threat 
can consist of a diverse range of features and objects (e.g., toward snakes, spiders, angry 
faces, bears, and crocodiles to name a few). It is, therefore, not known whether the threat-
detection system is driven by a broad category of “threat” or is only associated with a discreet 
set of low-level features that are associated with some categories of threat (i.e., a curved 
shape is associated with snakes, spiders’ legs, and a downward shaped mouth). 
In addition, for the threat bias to be driven by bottom-up attention, we would also 
expect that threat detection would be invariant to task demands. That is, using a visual search 
task, it would be expected that search times for detecting threatening stimuli would not 
increase with greater numbers of distractors. This is not what has been found as, instead, 
search times for angry faces have been found to increase with added distractors (Eastwood, 
Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). This appears to indicate that 
the processing of threatening faces requires attentional resources (Vuilleumier & Righart, 
2011), and is not purely bottom-up. 
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However, these research findings do not necessarily indicate that the threat bias is 
associated with top-down attention. Since visual information compete for representation in 
the visual cortex (Scalf, Torralbo, Tapia, & Beck, 2013), increasing display set-sizes, such as 
in the visual search task, results in greater stimulus competition. This leads to perceptual 
dilution, in which each stimulus is represented more weakly in the visual cortex (Scalf et al., 
2013). Visual search results indicate that threat stimuli, just like other neutral but attention-
grabbing stimuli (e.g., abrupt onsets or coloured objects), are affected by this competition. 
Therefore, although threatening faces do not result in “pop-out” effects, the bias may not 
reflect top-down attention. Instead, reduced detection of threat in the presence of greater 
numbers of distractors may simply reflect perceptual dilution. This body of research indicates 
that, although threat detection is affected by the number of stimuli in the visual field, it could 
still be driven by bottom-up mechanisms. The literature is, therefore, inconclusive. Social 
anxiety could be associated with an overactive bottom-up attentional system, resulting in a 
bias to threatening faces, or it could be associated with top-down attention. As a sidenote, 
considering that previous research has found separation in attentional resources between the 
right and left visual hemifields (e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004), a possibility for further 
research would be to test attentional biases for individuals with high levels of social anxiety 
toward faces presented within a hemifield versus across hemifields, as perceptual dilution and 
competition may be greater for stimuli presented to the same hemifield than across.  
Is the Threat Bias Driven by Bottom-Up Attention but Contingent on Top-Down 
Settings? 
Although there is some evidence for bottom-up biases to threat, it is likely that the 
threat bias associated with social anxiety is affected by top-down control. This is because 
attention to low-level visual stimuli (e.g., colours and abrupt onsets) can be eliminated under 
differing top-down settings (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). This contingent capture 
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effect has also been demonstrated with emotional faces. With a non-clinical population, 
Barratt and Bundesen (2012) employed a flanker task in which participants responded to the 
emotion of a central positive or negative schematic face accompanied by positive, negative, 
or neutral distractors faces. These researchers found slower RTs to respond to the positive 
face when flanked by negative distractor faces compared with neutral or positive distractor 
faces, indicating involuntary capture of attention by the negative faces. In a second 
experiment, Barratt and Bundesen (2012) employed target letters and found no slowing effect 
from negative face distractors. This suggests that attention to negative faces is not involuntary 
but dependent on attentional control settings (i.e., whether participants were searching for a 
face or letter). Reeck, LaBar, and Egner (2012) tested the role of top-down control settings 
for emotional faces for participants with low and high trait anxiety. In this task, participants 
responded to the orientation of a Gabor stimulus. Prior to its presentation, participants could 
receive an informative cue, indicating the location of the target Gabor. This provided a 
measure of top-down attentional guidance. Before the onset of the target, participants could 
also be presented with a neutral or fearful face presented either validly (in the location of the 
to-be-presented target Gabor) or invalidly (in the opposite location of the to-be-presented 
target Gabor). Differential responding on trials with the fearful face, compared with the 
neutral face, would indicate bottom-up attentional capture to fear. These researchers found an 
overall effect of speeded responses to the Gabor when participants received a top-down 
location cue. There was also an overall cueing effect (faster RTs on validly-cued compared 
with invalidly-cued trials) for the face. However, high trait anxious participants only 
demonstrated a cueing effect for the neutral face trials and not when there was a fearful face. 
Instead, the high trait anxious participants showed slowed responding on the valid fearful-
face trials. This is somewhat surprising and Reeck et al. proposed that it could be because the 
anxious participants may have experienced increased interference from the fearful faces, or 
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the fearful faces could have exhausted attentional resources needed to respond rapidly on the 
task. These results could indicate bottom-up capture (resulting in a slowing effect) from the 
fearful faces for high trait anxious participants. Critically, this effect was overridden when a 
top-down cue was provided, as high trait anxious participants no longer had differential 
responding to the fearful face. This provides support for contingent capture effects, as 
anxious participants can overcome their bottom-up biases to fear when given a top-down 
goal. 
One theoretical account of trait anxiety that encapsulates these processes is 
Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), which theorises 
that anxious individuals have an imbalance between top-down and bottom-up attention, with 
increased influences from bottom-up capture of attention and poorer top-down control. 
Particularly in stressful situations, anxious individuals are likely to have difficulty inhibiting 
attention toward task-irrelevant stimuli, shifting attention between tasks, as well as updating 
information (e.g., reading and operation spans). The above argument indicates that top-down 
attention is involved in attentional orienting to threat, as top-down control can override 
attentional capture and anxious individuals may have some deficits in top-down attentional 
control. 
Is the Threat Bias Driven by Top-Down Attention? 
An underlying assumption in the literature has been that threat biases are bottom-up in 
nature. Although attention to threat generally (e.g., to spiders, snakes, and angry faces) may 
have bottom-up contributions, it is possible that the threat bias associated with social anxiety 
could be driven by top-down attention. As discussed previously, top-down attention is driven 
by the goals of the individual. In addition, negative beliefs about the self and others are core 
factors in the conceptualisation of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg, 
1997). These beliefs may result in top-down goals, guiding the deployment of attention to 
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sources of attention that confirm those beliefs. For example, the belief that “everyone thinks 
I’m stupid” may result in top-down guidance of attention to critical facial expressions that 
confirm that belief. As discussed previously, to determine whether the threat bias is bottom-
up or top-down in nature, researchers have employed an additional WM load task to deplete 
top-down attentional resources. WM load selectively impairs top-down attention but not 
bottom-up attention (Jonides, 1981). If an attentional bias to threat is eliminated by the 
addition of a high WM load task, it would indicate that the bias is associated with top-down 
attention, whereas if the threat bias is unaffected by the addition of load, it would indicate 
that the threat bias is bottom-up. 
Researchers employing WM load tasks have found some evidence that attentional 
biases can be overcome under high WM load (Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider 
2002; Van Dillen & Koole, 2009). For instance, Van Dillen and Koole (2009) employed a 
variation of the Stroop paradigm, in which participants viewed faces of varying expressions, 
and were asked to indicate the gender of the faces. This study found that, compared with 
happy faces, angry faces resulted in slower gender naming, but only under low load. This 
suggests that the angry face captured attention under low load, but that this effect was 
eliminated when top-down attentional resources were taxed with the WM task. Since top-
down but not bottom-up attention shares resources with WM, this implicates top-down 
attentional processes in the attentional effect of the angry face. However, this body of 
research has looked at interference effects from threatening stimuli that are presented 
individually at an attended location rather than the capture of attention to the spatial location 
of a stimulus that is in competition with other stimuli elsewhere in the scene. Spatial 
attentional capture in the context of multi-item scenes is particularly important to 
understanding threat biases for socially anxious individuals (e.g., to understand visual 
attention to audience members when giving a speech or when in public). Therefore, the 
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research in this thesis examined spatial attentional capture in the context of competition 
between simultaneously-presented threatening and non-threatening stimuli.The possibility 
that spatial attentional capture may be driven by top-down attentional mechanisms was 
explored by Pessoa and Adolphs (2010). These researchers argued against the simplistic view 
that affective stimuli are exclusively processed automatically by subcortical structures. 
Instead they emphasised the network of cortical and subcortical structures (e.g., amygdala, 
orbitofrontal cortex, anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex) that allocate resources to 
prioritise processing of affective or motivationally significant stimuli. By this account, top-
down structures are involved, even in rapid orienting toward stimuli. This is consistent with a 
view of that top-down attentional control results from processing from frontal regions back 
into earlier visual regions, which can lead to rapid attentional orienting to goal-driven stimuli. 
This is supported by findings from Purkis, Lester, and Field’s (2011) visual search 
task study, which explored attentional capture by spiders and Doctor Who stimuli. Whereas it 
can be argued that attending to spiders may rely on specially evolved, bottom-up 
mechanisms, it is highly implausible that Doctor Who stimuli would have the same 
evolutionary value. Instead, it was hypothesised that, if attentional biases can be driven by a 
contextual or top-down motivational value, then an ardent Doctor Who fan should 
demonstrate a bias toward Doctor Who stimuli. This is exactly what this research found. 
Individuals with spider fear had slowed RTs when a distracting spider image was present and 
Doctor Who fans had slowed RTs when Doctor Who stimuli were present. This suggests that 
top-down factors, such as motivational value that does not stem from evolutionary 
significance, can drive attentional biases. Similarly, physiological hunger is associated with a 
temporary attentional bias toward food (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare, & Lee, 1998). Since bottom-
up processes are conceptualised as being invariant to contextual factors, it would not be 
expected that an evolved food bias would vary based on the individual’s motivation for food. 
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Similarly, heavy drinkers have a bias toward alcohol cues (Townshend & Duka, 2001), which 
does not have an associated survival value. This body of research is, therefore, consistent 
with the proposition that attentional biases are influenced by a flexible top-down system 
rather than relying on bottom-up mechanisms exclusively. 
Finally, Judah, Grant, Lechner, and Mills (2013) attempted to test the role of top-
down attention for threat-related biases associated with social anxiety. In this study, 
participants completed a dot-probe task with happy, disgust, and neutral facial expressions 
under three conditions: no, low, and high WM load. Judah et al. (2013) attempted to measure 
late stages of attention by presenting stimuli for long durations (1000ms). These researchers 
concluded that socially anxious individuals avoided disgust expressions under no WM load 
and had difficulty disengaging attention from disgust expressions under high WM load. 
However, this study did not separately analyse engagement and disengagement biases. Since 
participants first need to engage with an image before disengaging from it, any attempts to 
measure the disengagement bias was confounded by engagement effects. Further research is, 
therefore, needed to confirm these findings.  
Is the Threat Bias Driven by Selection History?  
Recently Peschard and Philippot (2016) theorised that selection history may have an 
important role in attentional biases toward threat for social anxiety. The framework posited 
by Peschard and Philippot (2016), emphasised the interplay between various factors of 
attention, which determine attentional selection for individuals with social anxiety. These 
factors include task goals, attentional control, WM, the emotional and motivational value of 
the stimulus, long-term memory, stimulus salience, and selection history. As discussed 
previously, selection history has been found to be an important mechanism that drives 
attention. However, Peschard and Philippot did not test this possibility that they proposed, 
and, to our knowledge, no other research has tested the role of selection history for detecting 
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facial expressions with either an unselected sample or with individuals with social anxiety. 
The research in this thesis rectifies this gap. 
Summary and Links to the Present Thesis 
Several decades of research indicate that a bias toward threatening visual information, 
such as angry and disgust facial expressions, is a critical maintaining, and possibly 
aetiological, factor contributing to social anxiety symptoms. However, this bias is not well 
understood. The research reviewed in this chapter indicates that bottom-up attention may be a 
part of an important evolutionary system that allows individuals to rapidly orient to threat. 
Socially anxious individuals could, therefore, have an overactive bottom-up system that more 
readily deploys attention to threat compared with non-anxious individuals. However, the 
evidence shows that it is likely that threat biases are affected by top-down factors. That is, the 
research reviewed either indicates that socially anxious individuals could have deficits in top-
down control or that the threat bias itself could be driven by a chronic top-down set to attend 
to threat. Finally, selection history may also contribute to the threat bias but there is, to our 
knowledge, no previous research testing this possibility. Indeed, if socially-anxious 
individuals are repeatedly and frequently selecting threatening information, then this 
highlights a potential role for selection history in contributing to the bias. 
Chapter Five tests the roles of top-down attention, bottom-up attention, and selection 
history in humans’ ability to orient to emotional faces. Chapter Six then extends on this 
research by investigating whether the ability to use top-down attentional control to orient to 
emotional faces is impaired for individuals with high levels of social anxiety. Next, Chapters 
Seven and Eight investigate whether the bias to threat for individuals with high social anxiety 
is associated with top-down or bottom-up attention. A dot-probe design was employed in the 
experiments throughout this thesis as the paradigm allows for the measurement of visual 
attentional shifts across space, it is a widely-used and established measure of spatial attention 
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(Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; MacLeod et 
al., 1986), and allows for the separate measurement of engagement and disengagement 
attentional biases. In sum, the research of this thesis lays the groundwork for understanding 
the underlying mechanisms of the threat bias so as to build our knowledge of social anxiety 
and guide further treatments.     
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Chapter Overview 
Chapter Six demonstrated that participants with high levels of social anxiety had a 
selective deficit in top-down attentional control, as they had difficulty orienting to a cued 
happy face when paired with a distracting angry face. No other impairments in top-down 
attentional orienting were found. Chapter Seven investigates whether this bias to threat is due 
to overactive bottom-up attentional capture or a chronically activated top-down set to threat 
(that is not overridden when instructed to attend to positive emotion, as in Chapter Six).   
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Abstract 
Selective attention toward threatening facial expressions has been found to precipitate and 
maintain symptoms of social anxiety. However, the automaticity of this bias is under debate. 
In the present study, we aimed to test whether top-down (controlled) engagement and 
disengagement of attention toward threatening faces is associated with social anxiety. This 
was examined by testing the impact of a secondary working memory (WM) load on 
attentional biases. In a variation of the dot-probe task, participants’ attention was initially 
cued to the left or right of fixation before an upright face paired with an inverted face was 
presented (displaying a disgust or neutral expression), and participants responded to a 
subsequently presented probe. The task was performed under no-load, low-load (one-digit 
memory task), and high-load (six-digit memory task) conditions. Social anxiety was not 
found to be associated with delayed disengagement from threat. However, surprisingly, high 
social anxiety was associated with an engagement bias away from threat, whereas low social 
anxiety was associated with a bias toward threat. These results were unaffected by the WM 
load manipulation. This indicates that engagement with threatening facial expressions has 
minimal contributions from top-down mechanisms, since it is likely that orienting to facial 
expressions occurs relatively automatically.  
 
 
Keywords: selective attention, spatial attention, working memory load, social anxiety, dot-
probe.  
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Social Anxiety and Attentional Biases: A Top-Down Contribution? 
When interacting with our environment, we are bombarded with visual information, 
only a small amount of which can be consciously processed due to our limited perceptual 
resources (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kastner & Pinsk, 2004). Selective attention is, 
therefore, used to filter information so that the visual system can preferentially attend to 
important and relevant aspects of the visual environment. Consequently, selective attention is 
integral in shaping our perception of the world around us. One factor that exerts a powerful 
influence over selective attention is an individual’s level of anxiety. For example, although 
healthy individuals may show a small bias for preferentially processing threatening stimuli 
(e.g., feared objects such as snakes) over neutral stimuli, this bias is heightened for 
individuals with anxiety. Indeed, this threat bias is viewed as a core cognitive component of 
anxiety and central to many contemporary conceptualisations of clinical anxiety disorders 
and their treatments (Cisler & Koster, 2010). For example, some longitudinal studies suggest 
that threat biases in childhood predict the development of anxiety disorders later in life 
(Shechner et al., 2012). Furthermore, threat biases are involved in the maintenance of anxiety, 
since attentional training to reduce threat biases also reduces anxiety (for a review, see Bar-
Haim, 2010).  
Given the sensitivity of socially anxious individuals to negative social evaluation, 
threatening facial expressions hold special clinical significance for this population (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). According to Rapee and Heimberg’s cognitive model, individuals with 
social anxiety are hypervigilant to monitoring their external environment for signs of negative 
evaluation from others. For example, when giving a speech, a socially anxious individual will 
be more likely to scan their audience for facial signs of criticism or disapproval (e.g., 
frowning), which then increases their level of anxiety. This model is supported by research 
findings that socially anxious individuals show biased attention toward photos depicting 
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angry, hostile, and disgust expressions compared with neutral facial expressions (Mogg, 
Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Pishyar, Harris, & Menzies, 2004).  
In the present study, we aimed to test whether these threat biases are driven by 
bottom-up or top-down attention. Top-down attention refers to the voluntary allocation of 
attention toward particular objects, features, or spatial locations based on one’s current goals. 
For example, when looking for a friend in a crowd, knowing that the friend is wearing a red 
scarf allows one to selectively attend to red objects. By contrast, bottom-up attention is an 
involuntary, rapid, and inflexible process that selects visual information based on the salience 
of the stimulus features. For example, while searching for a red object, an individual’s 
attention may be captured by a flashing billboard even though the person had no intention to 
attend to that stimulus.  
Traditionally, threat biases have been conceptualised as bottom-up. In line with this 
notion, evolutionary models posit that being able to respond to threat through bottom-up 
processing is adaptive (Kenrick, Neuberg, Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller, 2010; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; LeDoux, 1996; LoBue, Rakison, & DeLoache, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Öhman, 2007). That is, being able to detect a threatening stimulus in the 
environment has evolved in the human species to facilitate survival (e.g., a fight or flight 
response to a predator) and is part of an automatic vigilance mechanism (Pratto & John, 
1991). In support of this argument, research has shown that humans can engage early and 
rapid detection of low-level perceptual features associated with threatening images (LoBue, 
2014; LoBue & DeLoache, 2011; LoBue & Larson, 2010). For example, using a visual search 
task, LoBue (2014) observed a bias toward curvilinear shapes (representative of snakes) 
compared with rectangular shapes. In addition, this bias to curvilinear shapes increases after 
watching a fearful film clip (LoBue, 2014), indicating that anxiety increases the detection of 
threat-relevant, low-level perceptual features. Similarly, biases for angry face features, such 
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as the downward “V” shape of the eyebrows, have been found in both child and adult 
populations, which these authors argue indicates an evolved attentional bias for threatening 
stimuli (LoBue & Larson, 2010).  
However, in opposition to this argument, research has found that threat detection does 
not always occur automatically. Visual search requires participants to detect an object or 
feature as rapidly as possible amongst distractor objects in a visual array. Using this task, past 
research has found that socially anxious individuals detect angry faces among neutral 
distractors more rapidly than happy faces among neutral distractors (Gilboa-Schechtman, 
Foa, & Amir, 1999). However, search times have been found to increase with added 
distractors (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2001; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Since 
automaticity in visual search has traditionally been conceptualised as being invariant to the 
number of distractors in the display (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), this suggests that the 
processing of threatening faces is not purely bottom-up as it requires attentional resources 
(Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Vuilleumier & Righart, 2011).  
The involvement of attentional resources in this process of orienting toward threat can 
be assessed with the use of working memory (WM) load. Previous research has found that 
tasks with high WM loads result in greater interference effects from visual distractors 
compared with low WM load tasks (de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001). Thus, voluntary, 
top-down selective attention can be impaired by WM load. By contrast, bottom-up attention 
is unaffected by WM load (e.g., Jonides, 1981). In the present study, therefore, we imposed a 
WM load to selectively impair the top-down attentional system without impacting bottom-up 
mechanisms.  
Researchers employing WM load tasks have found some evidence that attentional 
biases can be overcome under high WM load (Pessoa et al., 2002; Van Dillen & Koole, 
2009). For instance, Van Dillen and Koole employed an interference paradigm, in which 
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participants viewed faces of varying expressions and were asked to indicate the gender of the 
faces. This study found that, as compared with happy faces, angry faces resulted in slower 
gender naming, but only under low-load. These researchers propose that, under high-load, 
negative stimuli do not capture attention because WM is fully engaged by the task. Only 
under low-load, when there are spare attentional resources, can negative stimuli are 
prioritised. However, this body of research has looked at interference effects from threatening 
stimuli that are presented individually at an attended location, rather than the capture of 
attention to the spatial location of a stimulus that is in competition with other stimuli 
elsewhere in the scene. Spatial attentional capture is particularly important to understanding 
threat biases for socially anxious individuals as they may cause individuals, when giving a 
speech for example, to attend to threatening faces in a top-down fashion, thus increasing their 
anxiety.  
Recently, Judah, Grant, Lechner, and Mills (2013) assessed the top-down nature of 
the threat bias with socially anxious individuals by presenting participants with images of 
happy, disgust, and neutral facial expressions in a dot-probe task under three conditions: no, 
low, and high WM load. In the modified dot-probe task, two faces (e.g., one neutral and one 
negative) are presented on the computer screen, one to the left and one to the right of fixation. 
A probe (e.g., a letter) is then presented in the locus of one of the faces and participants are 
asked to respond to its identity. Faster reaction times (RTs) to respond to a probe appearing in 
the locus of a negative facial expression compared to a probe in the locus of a neutral facial 
expression indicates that participants’ attention was captured by the negative face. This is 
known as a threat bias.    
Judah et al. (2013) used a long presentation time for the faces (1000ms), which they 
claimed measured later attentional mechanisms of disengagement and avoidance. These 
researchers found that socially anxious individuals displayed avoidance of disgust 
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expressions under no WM load but had difficulty disengaging attention under high WM load. 
However, one issue with this study, and that of the dot-probe design more generally, is that 
engagement and disengagement biases are conflated. Therefore, a threat bias can arise either 
due to enhanced engagement with that face or delayed disengagement from it. Although 
Judah et al. (2013) claimed that disengagement biases can be assessed using a long 
presentation time, this assumes that all participants initially shift their attention equally 
toward the threatening stimulus. If, however, individuals with higher levels of socially 
anxiety more readily engage with the threatening face, any attempt to measure the 
disengagement bias is conflated with engagement effects. Due to this issue, it cannot be 
determined whether the finding that social anxiety is linked to a threat bias is due to enhanced 
engagement or delayed disengagement effects.   
Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky, Basanovic, and MacLeod (2014) have 
developed an elegant method for differentiating engagement biases from disengagement 
biases using a variation of the dot-probe task. In this design, on each trial participants viewed 
a target image (a threatening or neutral scene) paired with a non-representational image 
(abstract art) and participants’ shifts of attention toward and away from the location of the 
target image was measured. Specifically, these researchers presented an initial cue (a small 
red line oriented horizontally or vertically) before the presentation of the faces. This cue was 
presented either on the left or right side of the screen and, therefore, secured participants’ 
attention in the same location or opposite location to the target image. A disengagement trial 
was defined as a trial in which the target image was presented in the same location as the 
preceding cue, as participants were required to disengage their attention from the target to 
respond to a subsequent probe in the distal location. An engagement trial, by contrast, was 
defined as a trial in which the target was presented in the opposite location to the preceding 
cue, as these trials measured whether participants shifted their attention toward the target. 
200 
 
After the cue and faces were presented, a probe (similar in appearance to the cue) was 
presented in the locus of one of the faces and participants were asked to indicate whether the 
probe was the same or a different orientation to the cue. On 50% of trials, the probe appeared 
in the distal location to the target face and on 50% of trials, it appeared in the proximal 
location. Therefore, for engagement trials, faster RTs in the proximal probe position 
compared with the distal position, indicated that participants shifted their attention toward the 
target face. Importantly, these distal-proximal probe difference scores were compared 
between trials in which the target image was negative compared with when it was neutral, to 
measure if greater engagement toward threat occurred for anxious participants. Similarly, 
difference scores were used to measure the disengagement bias to test whether participants 
had greater difficulty shifting away from the target image and responding to the distally 
presented probe, compared with the proximal probe, when a negative target image was used 
compared with a neutral target image. Both Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. 
(2014) found that high trait anxious participants, compared with low trait anxious 
participants, have engagement biases and delayed disengagement biases for threat. 
Although it was published after data collection for the present study was complete, a 
recent study employed a similar design to measure engagement and disengagement biases for 
participants with low and high social anxiety (Grafton & MacLeod, 2016). On each trial, 
negative and neutral faces were paired together and these researchers found that participants 
with high social anxiety had a greater engagement bias toward negative facial expressions 
compared with participants with low social anxiety. Social anxiety was not found to be 
associated with difficulties disengaging from threat. These data indicate the importance, 
therefore, of differentiating these biases from one another. The present study will extend on 
Grafton and MacLeod’s research by testing whether these biases are driven by top-down or 
bottom-up attentional orienting (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner, 1980). Specifically, the 
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present study includes an additional WM load task to test if attentional biases are affected by 
high WM load, which would indicate that they are driven by top-down attention. 
Present Experiment 
In the present study, we sought to investigate the contribution of top-down attention in 
the selective processing of threatening visual information for individuals with high social 
anxiety. This was tested using a variation of the dot-probe task (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; 
Rudaizky et al., 2014), in which participants were presented with neutral and disgust facial 
expressions and their engagement with and ability to disengage from these faces were 
measured. The dot-probe task provides an opportunity to measure spatial attention, which is 
of particular clinical relevance to social anxiety and also allows for the separate analysis of 
engagement and disengagement biases. Engagement and disengagement biases were 
compared under three conditions: no WM load, low WM load, and high WM load. WM load 
was used to deplete top-down attentional resources. Under no and low WM load, it was 
expected that higher social anxiety would be associated with an engagement bias toward the 
disgust faces. If the engagement bias is driven by bottom-up attention, this bias would be 
unaffected by the load manipulation. However, if the engagement bias is driven by top-down 
attention, this bias would be attenuated under high WM load. Regarding disengagement 
effects, recent research has found that social anxiety is not associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat (Grafton & MacLeod, 2016). However, trait anxiety, which shares 
many similar features with social anxiety, has been found to be associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). With this 
study, therefore, we aimed to elucidate whether social anxiety is associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat and, if it is, whether it is affected by WM load. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred participants (53 female) were recruited from the Australian National 
University via online advertisement and the university electronic sign-up system and these 
participants completed the experiment in exchange for course credit or $30 payment. 
Participants all reported to have normal or corrected vision, their ages ranged from 17 to 36 
years (M=22.43, SD=3.62) and 91 of them were right-handed. Participants’ social anxiety 
scores, as measured by the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1989) 
ranged from 3 to 64 (M=26.18, SD=12.94). These scores are somewhat higher than would be 
expected based on the normative data of Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, and Liebowitz 
(1992), who found a mean of 19.9 on the SIAS in a community sample. Heimberg et al. 
(1992) defined the clinical cut-off for social phobia as equal to or greater than 34 on the 
SIAS, which reflected one SD above the mean score of the community sample.  
Participants’ depression scores on the depression component of the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) ranged from 0 to 39 (M=5.69, 
SD=5.79) and, as measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Scale (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), state anxiety ranged from 20 to 62 (M=33.7, SD=9.21) and 
trait anxiety ranged from 24 to 72 (M=42.55, SD=9.06). All participants provided written 
informed consent prior to participation and provided demographic information. Table 1 
presents demographic and self-report scores for participants with low and high social anxiety, 
as calculated using a median split.  
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Table 1 
Demographic and self-report scores for low and high social anxiety groups 
 Participants 
(Female) 
Age 
M(SD) 
SIAS 
M(SD) 
DASS-D 
M(SD) 
STAI-S 
M(SD) 
STAI-T 
M(SD) 
Low social 
anxiety 
50 (26) 22.26 
(3.39) 
15.72 
(5.65) 
3.66 
(3.86) 
30.10 
(7.00) 
36.54 
(7.47) 
High social 
anxiety 
50 (27) 22.40 
(3.66) 
36.64 
(9.10) 
7.72 
(6.67) 
37.30 
(9.79) 
46.56 
(8.79) 
 
Images 
Images of faces was taken from the FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, & 
Lindenberger, 2010), consisting of the neutral and disgust expressions from Set A of the 
young age range (ages 19-31). Since research has found a same-age facial recognition bias 
(Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012), the young age range faces were included in this study to match 
the average age of participants. On each trial the two faces presented were taken from the 
same face model so that they were matched for facial properties, and one image was 
presented upright and one image was inverted. Each image subtended 6.81 x 8.52° of visual 
angle. 
Experimental Task 
Participants completed the demographic questions, the SIAS, STAI, and depression 
items from the DASS, and then participated in the computer task. This experiment was 
conducted in a dimly lit room. Stimuli were presented on a cathode-ray tube (CRT) gamma-
corrected monitor running at a 75Hz refresh rate. Viewing distance was set with a chinrest at 
44cm. Stimuli were programed in Matlab using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) 
and the background was set to black.  
The computer task consisted of three blocks of trials (no-load, low-load, and high-
load) counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of 224 trials and so each 
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participant completed a total of 672 trials. Before each block, participants completed five 
practice trials with corrective feedback. 
In the low- and high-load conditions, a number was presented centrally on the screen 
at the beginning and end of each trial (see Figure 1). A single-digit number was used in the 
low-load condition and a six-digit number was used in the high-load condition. The digits in 
these numbers could range between 1 and 9 and were generated using a random number 
generator. On approximately half the trials the number presented at the end of the trial 
matched the one presented at the beginning and on approximately half of the trials it changed. 
In the high-load condition, the number could only change by one of the digits so the 
participant was required to remember all six digits to determine if it was the same or 
different. For the low-load task, the single-digit number was presented for 1000ms, whereas 
in the high-load task, the six-digit number was presented for 3000ms, which provided 
sufficient time to read the number strings. Participants were then asked to make a 
same/different keyboard press to indicate whether it matched the number presented at the 
beginning of the trial.  
Regarding the main probe task, initially a blank screen was presented for 1000ms. On 
each trial two white rectangular outlines were initially presented, one to the left and one to 
the right of fixation for 1000ms. These rectangular outlines subtended 6.81 x 8.52° of visual 
angle and the width of the lines subtended 0.089°. A smaller red rectangle, subtending 1.70 x 
2.13°, was also presented inside one of the white rectangles to indicate the location of the to-
be-presented cue. The cue (a small red line) was then presented within the box for 200ms. 
This cue could be oriented horizontally or vertically and subtended a visual angle of 0.48° 
and had a width of 0.089°. 
After these stimuli disappeared, two images of faces were presented for 500ms, one to 
the left and one to the right of fixation, such that they occupied the locations that the white 
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rectangles previously occupied. After these faces offset, a probe (a small red line) oriented 
horizontally or vertically, which was identical in appearance to the cue, was then presented in 
the locus of one of the faces and was oriented horizontally or vertically. Participants made a 
keyboard press to report whether the orientation of the probe matched the orientation of the 
cue as quickly and accurately as possible. The variables (location, orientation, and image 
type) were randomised, with the restriction that an equal number of trials consisted of 
disengagement or engagement trials, negative or neutral upright photos, and that the probe 
was distal or proximal to the upright image 
 
Figure 1. A schematic of an engagement trial under high-load.  
An engagement trial was defined as a trial in which the upright face was presented in 
the opposite location of the preceding cue (for a discussion, see Rudaizky et al., 2014). This 
is because these trials measure the likelihood that participants will shift their attention toward 
the upright face. By contrast, for disengagement trials, the upright face was presented in the 
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same location as the preceding cue. Therefore, participants were required to disengage their 
attention from the upright face to respond to a subsequent probe in the distal location.  
Calculation of bias indices. In accordance with the method developed by Grafton 
and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. (2014), engagement bias and disengagement bias 
indices were calculated. Higher scores for the attentional engagement bias index reflects 
facilitated attentional orienting toward the disgust expression compared with the neutral 
expression. The equation is as follows:Engagement bias index = (Cue probe distal to upright 
negative image in upright negative/inverted image pair: RT for target probes distal to upright 
negative image minus RT for target probes proximal to upright negative image) minus (Cue 
probe distal to neutral upright image in neutral upright/inverted image pair: RT for target 
probes distal to upright neutral image minus RT for target probes proximal to upright neutral 
image). 
Similarly, higher scores for the attentional disengagement bias index reflects greater 
difficulty disengaging from the disgust expression compared with the neutral expression. The 
equation is as follows: 
Disengagement bias index = (Cue probe proximal to upright negative image in 
upright negative/inverted image pair: RT for target probe distal to upright negative 
image minus RT for target probe proximal to upright negative image) minus (Cue 
probe proximal to upright neutral image in upright neutral/inverted image pair: RT for 
target probe distal to upright neutral image minus RT for target probe proximal to 
upright neutral image). 
Results 
The data from two participants were excluded due to technical failure. A further 
participants’ data were excluded due to responding quicker than 100ms throughout the 
experiment, indicating random responding. Finally, three participants’ data were excluded as 
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their overall RTs were slower than 3.29 SDs from average. Therefore, 94 participants’ data 
were included in further statistical analyses.  
The mean accuracies on the probe task was 94.96% (SD=3.47) in the no-load 
condition, 96.89% (SD=2.72) in the low-load condition, and 96.08% (SD=2.83) in the high-
load condition. The mean accuracy on the digit-span task was significantly (t(93)=7.10, 
p<.001) higher in the low-load condition (M=94.56%, SD=4.17) compared with the high-load 
condition (M=89.94%, SD=7.79) indicating that, as expected, the six-digit task was more 
difficult than the one-digit task. 
Data from trials in which participants performed incorrectly on the probe task were 
excluded from analyses because this indicates that participants were not attending in the 
correct location at the beginning of the trial. In addition, in the low- and high-load conditions, 
trials in which participants responded incorrectly on the digit task were excluded as the load 
manipulation may not have been successful on these trials. Further exclusions were made for 
trials in which RTs were less than 100ms or greater than 2.5 standard deviations above the 
individual participant’s mean RT. Each participants’ mean performance was then calculated 
for each condition. The average percentage of excluded trials was 7.60% for the no-load 
condition, 13.26% for the low-load condition, and 18.20% for the high-load condition.  
Engagement Bias  
Since the construct of social fear is a continuous variable in the population (McNeil, 
2010), social anxiety was analysed as continuous in this study. Furthermore, since 
engagement and disengagement biases are separate attentional processes (Grafton & 
MacLeod, 2014), they were analysed separately. Using the engagement bias index equation, 
each participant’s engagement bias was calculated. To analyse the engagement bias, a 
repeated-measures ANCOVA was performed with the within-subject factor of load (no, low, 
and high) and the continuous variable of social anxiety. Mauchley’s test indicated that the 
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assumption of sphericity had been violated for load (χ2(2)=15.53, p<.001) and, therefore, 
degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of sphericity (ε = 
.86).  
Load was not found to be significant (F(1.73, 91)=.85, p=.416, ηp2=.009), which 
indicates that the engagement bias index did not alter across the no-load, low-load, and high-
load conditions. In addition, the interaction between load and social anxiety was not 
significant (F(1.73, 91)=.64, p=.507, ηp2=.007). However, a significant trend effect was found 
for the relationship between social anxiety level and the engagement bias index (F(1, 
92)=3.12, p=.081, ηp2=.033). Scatterplots revealed that, surprisingly, the engagement bias 
index decreased with increasing levels of social anxiety. To quantify the effect, a median 
split was conducted to compare participants with low versus high social anxiety. Participants 
with low social anxiety had a mean engagement bias index of 4.97ms and participants with 
high social anxiety had a mean engagement bias index of -6.61ms. This indicates that low 
social anxiety was associated with a slight bias toward disgust expressions and high social 
anxiety was associated with a slight bias away from disgust expressions. Raw data are 
presented in Appendix A. 
Post-hoc exploratory analyses. Due to past research indicating that people rapidly 
habituate to threatening images (Breiter et al., 1996; Staugaard, 2009), it was hypothesised 
that the threat bias may have diminished over the course of the experiment. To further 
elucidate the trend engagement effect found in the previous analysis, the data from 
participants’ first block (224 trials) of data were analysed. An ANCOVA was performed with 
the between-subjects factor of load (no, low, and high) and the continuous predictor variable 
of social anxiety. The main effect of load was not significant (F(2, 90)=1.51, p=.227, 
ηp2=.032), confirming that load did not impact engagement toward disgust expressions. 
However the impact of social anxiety on the engagement bias index was significant (F(1, 
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90)=4.66, p=.034, ηp2=.049). Similar to the overall analysis, observation of scatterplots (see 
Figure 2) indicated that the engagement bias index decreased with higher levels of social 
anxiety. In addition, a median split indicated that participants with low social anxiety had an 
engagement bias index of 10.26ms, which suggests that they had a bias toward threat, and 
participants with high social anxiety had an engagement bias index of -10.50ms, indicating a 
bias away from threat. Raw data are presented are Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between social anxiety and attentional engagement toward threat.  
Disengagement Bias  
 To analyse the disengagement bias index, a repeated-measures ANCOVA was 
performed with the within-subject factor of load (no, low, and high) and the continuous 
predictor variable of social anxiety. Load was not significant (F(2, 91)=.03, p=.975, 
ηp2≤.001), which indicates that the disengagement bias index did not alter across the no-load, 
low-load, and high-load conditions. In addition, no significant effects were found for social 
210 
 
anxiety level (F(2, 91)=.283, p=.596, ηp2=.003) or the interaction between load and social 
anxiety (F(2, 91)=.95, p=.387, ηp2=.010). This indicates that social anxiety was not associated 
with difficulty disengaging from disgust facial expressions.  
 A sidenote on these results was that, unexpectedly, participants were faster to respond 
to a probe presented in the distal location (M=698ms) compared with the proximal location 
(M=717ms) of the upright image (F(1, 92)=6.06, p=.016, ηp2=.062). This suggests that 
participants had already disengaged from the upright image, both for neutral and disgust 
expressions, when the probe appeared. The implications of this are addressed in the 
discussion. 
Discussion 
Despite the proliferation of research exploring attentional biases, the differential roles 
of bottom-up and top-down attentional mechanisms remain unclear. Using a variation of the 
dot-probe task, the present project aimed to test whether engagement and disengagement 
biases toward negative facial expressions for individuals with higher levels of social anxiety 
are driven by top-down attention. Specifically, the present project employed a WM load task 
to manipulate the availability of top-down attentional resources to test if this impacted 
attentional biases toward threat. 
Do Socially Anxious Individuals have an Engagement Bias Toward Threat? 
 Surprisingly this study did not find any evidence that individuals with higher social 
anxiety have an engagement bias toward disgust expressions compared with neutral 
expressions. In fact, the study found the opposite effect. Although only significant at trend 
levels (p =.081), the present study found that increasing levels of social anxiety was 
associated with a decreased engagement bias. In fact, individuals with high social anxiety 
were faster to respond to probes following neutral expressions compared with the disgust 
expressions, indicating a bias away from threat.  
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We hypothesised that the effects may have become diluted over the course of the 
experiment due to habituation to threat. The present study included 224 trials per load 
condition, which totalled 672 trials per participant. Past research indicates that participants 
rapidly habituate to emotional faces in the dot-probe task (Staugaard, 2009), which may have 
accounted for the small effect that was found. To explore this possibility, each participants’ 
first block of trials (totalling 224 trials) were analysed separately. The trend that was found in 
the previous analysis was now significant (p=.034), indicating that participants with lower 
levels of social anxiety had an engagement bias toward the disgust expressions and 
participants with high social anxiety had a bias away from the disgust expressions.  
These results differ from Grafton and MacLeod’s (2016) study, which found that 
socially anxious individuals had an engagement bias toward negative facial expressions. This 
is surprising as these two studies aimed to measure the same attentional processes. However, 
there are some differences in the experimental design, which may account for these opposing 
results. In Grafton and MacLeod’s (2016) study, they paired negative and neutral faces 
together on each trial. By contrast, the present study was more similar to the design employed 
by Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. (2014) who presented the neutral and 
negative images on separate trials. However, whereas Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and 
Rudaizky et al. (2014) paired the threat and neutral scenes with an abstract image on each 
trial, the present study paired negative and neutral faces with their inverted face counterpart 
to control for low level visual properties that may capture attention. Any of these 
methodological differences, either individually or in concert, may be the reason for the 
contrasting pattern of results.  
The lack of threat engagement bias for high socially anxious individuals found in this 
study reflects the complex nature of attention. For instance, past research has found enhanced 
engagement toward threat, delayed disengagement from threat, avoidance of threat, or even 
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no biases at all (see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Furthermore, research has recently emerged 
suggesting that anxiety is associated with high variability in attending to threat (Zvielli, 
Bernstein, & Koster, 2015). On a dot-probe task, Zvielli et al. (2015) calculated a trial-level 
bias score by subtracting temporally contiguous pairs of congruent trials (when the probe was 
presented in the locus of a threatening image) with incongruous trials (when the probe was 
presented in the locus of a neutral image). This study found that, compared to healthy 
controls, spider phobics had greater variability in attentional capture throughout the 
experiment, sometimes displaying biases toward spider-related material and sometimes 
displaying biases away from threat. An average bias score across an experiment does not 
reveal these temporal dynamics. The current bias away from threat could, therefore, reflect 
the fact that the socially anxious participants tended to avoid the threatening faces for longer 
(more trials) after initially engaging with the threatening face.  
A second possibility is that individuals with high social anxiety were attracted to the 
threat value of the inverted face. Inverted faces were selected as the paired face to control for 
attentional capture due to low-level perceptual differences across the two presented images. 
Furthermore, a large body of research indicates that emotion processing of faces is disrupted 
by inversion as the spatial-relations of the face are not properly processed (de Gelder, 
Teunisse, & Benson, 1997; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996). However, more recent research 
indicates that, although inverted faces are processed in a more piecemeal manner, rapid 
emotion detection can still occur (Arnold & Lipp, 2011). As described previously, the 
cognitive model of social anxiety posits that individuals with social anxiety are hypervigilant 
to monitoring their external environment for signs of negative evaluation from others (Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). In the presence of threat, it is possible that this hypervigiliance displayed 
by socially anxious individuals caused them to monitor the inverted face as well as the 
upright face. Further research is, therefore, needed to test whether the lack of engagement 
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bias displayed by highly socially anxious individuals is driven by greater temporal variabiliy 
or due to the choice of inverted face as the paired image. 
Do Socially Anxious Individuals have a Disengagement Bias Toward Threat? 
The present study found no evidence that socially anxious individuals have a 
disengagement bias toward disgust expressions. This is consistent with Grafton and 
MacLeod’s (2016) conclusion that social anxiety is associated with unusual engagement 
toward threat but not difficulty disengaging from threat. However, one potential issue with 
this conclusion is that the present study found faster RTs in the distal probe position 
compared with the proximal probe position. This means that on average, when the probe 
appeared, participants had already disengaged their attention from the position of the target 
face. It is possible that a briefer presentation time for the faces is needed to capture a delayed 
disengagement effect as the present study employed a presentation time of 500ms.  
A further reason to be hesitant to conclude that socially anxiety is not associated with 
delayed disengagement is that trait anxiety, which has similar theoretical underpinnings to 
social anxiety, is associated with delayed disengagement from threat (Grafton & MacLeod, 
2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). For instance, using 500ms and 1000ms presentation times, 
Rudaizky et al. (2014) paired visual scenes (threatening or neutral) with images of abstract art 
and found that participants with high trait anxiety had a delayed disengagement bias for threat 
compared with low trait anxious participants. It is possible that participants may take longer 
to process complex visual scenes than faces, therefore, taking longer to disengage attention 
from a visual scene compared with a face. Interestingly, Grafton and MacLeod (2014), who 
utilised a similar design to Rudaizky et al. (2014), found delayed disengagement from threat 
for high trait anxious participants at 100ms stimulus durations but not 500ms stimulus 
durations. Disengagement effects, therefore, may be more robust for short stimulus 
presentation times. This indicates that, before conclusions about social anxiety and 
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disengagement effects can be made, it is essential for further research to test these effects at 
durations shorter than 500ms.  
The Effect of WM Load on Engagement and Disengagement Biases 
In addition to measuring engagement and disengagement threat biases associated with 
social anxiety, the present study aimed to test whether these were driven by top-down 
attention. This study found no effect of WM load for both the engagement and 
disengagement analyses. Unfortunately, since a social anxiety related disengagement bias 
toward threat was not found, the impact of WM load on such a bias cannot be determined. 
However, although the engagement effects were unexpected, an engagement bias toward 
threat was found for low socially anxious individuals and a bias away from threat was found 
for high socially anxious individuals. These results were unaffected by the load manipulation, 
indicating that they are bottom-up. This result is in accordance with the traditional view that 
anxiety is associated with an overactive bottom-up threat detection system (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Öhman, 2007). 
Conclusion and Implications 
 In sum, the present study indicated that social anxiety is associated with unusual 
engagement with negative facial expressions. Specifically, participants with high social 
anxiety had a slight bias away from threat and participants with low social anxiety had a bias 
toward threat. This was unaffected by WM load, which indicates that engagement with threat 
requires few attentional resources and is, therefore, largely driven by bottom-up attention. 
Social anxiety was not found to be associated with differences in disengagement from threat. 
Due to mixed findings in the literature, further research is now needed to clarify the 
conditions under which high social anxiety is associated with biases either toward or away 
from threat. In addition, as discussed previously, further research using shorter presentation 
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times is needed before concluding that social anxiety is not associated with delayed 
disengagement from threat.   
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Appendix A 
Data Summary 
Data for the no-load, low-load and high-load conditions are presented in Table A1, Table A2, 
and Table A3, respectively. In addition, attentional engagement bias index and 
disengagement bias index data are presented in Table A4. Low and high social anxiety 
groups were calculated using a median split.  
Table A1 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the no-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 723.24 (140.27) 688.49 (151.48) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 696.82 (140.87) 656.02 (155.37) 
 Neutral Distal 731.97 (147.31) 692.72 (157.55) 
  Proximal 691.95 (159.26) 655.33 (173.96) 
Proximal Negative Distal 711.45 (144.62) 684.94 (163.66) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 743.72 (151.00) 700.86 (174.18) 
 Neutral Distal 696.83 (139.50) 670.15 (160.89) 
  Proximal 724.91 (159.45) 685.95 (151.10) 
 
Table A2 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the low-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 780.42 (167.80) 721.12 (175.19) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 760.50 (168.82) 712.69 (207.34) 
 Neutral Distal 786.83 (179.25) 755.62 (216.03) 
  Proximal 776.43 (193.29) 724.63 (183.32) 
Proximal Negative Distal 773.63 (181.00) 724.86 (191.63) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 792.65 (195.46) 725.72 (169.50) 
 Neutral Distal 756.25 (165.45) 720.51 (186.21) 
  Proximal 785.41 (170.95) 744.75 (184.28) 
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Table A3 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the high-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 712.25 (148.15) 649.01 (108.89) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 671.27 (144.95) 624.89 (112.56)  
 Neutral Distal 697.32 (150.32) 645.99 (108.80) 
  Proximal 675.31 (143.51) 629.50 (103.89) 
Proximal Negative Distal 680.27 (157.41) 634.69 (119.23) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 708.97 (151.39) 655.56 (118.55) 
 Neutral Distal 674.31 (134.42) 648.35 (130.86) 
  Proximal 698.97 (153.45) 642.09 (126.56) 
 
Table A4 
Means and standard deviations of attentional bias index scores for the three load conditions 
 Load condition  Engagement bias Disengagement bias 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -13.60 (94.07) -4.19 (93.60) 
 Low load 9.52 (112.44) 10.15 (80.05) 
 High load 18.98 (100.65) -4.05 (124.66) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -4.91 (76.92) -0.12 (75.77) 
 Low load -22.56 (115.26) 23.38 (90.77) 
 High load 7.63 (73.38) -27.12 (93.21) 
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Appendix B 
Data Summary: First Block of Trials 
Data for the no-load, low-load and high-load conditions for participants’ first block of trials 
(224 trials) are presented in Table B1, Table B2, and Table B3, respectively. In addition, 
attentional engagement bias index and disengagement bias index data are presented in Table 
A4. Low and high social anxiety groups were calculated using a median split.  
 
Table B1 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the no-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups for block one of trials 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social anxiety 
M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 710.058(134.71) 799.34 (151.82) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 702.54 (163.45) 752.71 (149.92) 
 Neutral Distal 722.72 (148.28) 809.19 (162.17) 
  Proximal 683.19 (156.20) 
 
778.05 (187.63) 
Proximal Negative Distal 722.66 (168.05) 799.73 (152.24) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 729.73 (140.94) 822.73 (203.16) 
 Neutral Distal 707.75 (162.00) 780.81 (150.22) 
  Proximal 694.61 (118.85) 785.94 (158.89) 
 
Table B2 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the low-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups for block one of trials 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social anxiety 
M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 854.28 (162.58) 725.13 (140.48) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 824.28 (172.89) 740.04 (175.22) 
 Neutral Distal 839.20 (172.10) 753.05 (174.54) 
  Proximal 834.99 (197.25) 726.63 (151.73) 
Proximal Negative Distal 857.06 (179.15) 733.91 (151.94) 
(attentional disengagement 
trials) 
Proximal 861.56 (156.94) 
 
741.99 (158.85) 
 Neutral Distal 831.80 (179.33) 727.39(136.719) 
  Proximal 852.97 (167.62) 736.03 (163.06) 
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Table A3 
Mean response times (ms) obtained in the high-load condition for low and high social anxiety 
groups for block one of trials 
Cue locus Image valence  Target 
probe locus 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
Distal Negative Distal 795.51 (94.36) 654.04 (83.84) 
(attentional engagement trials) Proximal 729.99 (106.39) 645.42 (108.40)  
 Neutral Distal 783.62 (112.04) 658.37 (86.81) 
  Proximal 767.76 (95.05) 643.53 (104.24) 
Proximal Negative Distal 756.83 (124.60) 652.17 (108.39) 
(attentional disengagement trials) Proximal 784.69 (108.30) 678.97 (91.45) 
 
 Neutral Distal 717.69 (89.50) 674.93 (115.75) 
  Proximal 785.98 (145.19) 660.09 (98.46) 
 
Table B4 
Means and standard deviations of attentional bias index scores for the three load conditions 
for block one of trials 
 Load condition  Engagement bias Disengagement bias 
Low social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -32.01 (60.84) -20.21 (66.91) 
 Low load 25.80 (107.87) 16.68 (87.76) 
 High load 49.66 (92.51) 40.44 (160.04) 
High social 
anxiety M (SD) 
No load -15.49 (100.77) -17.88 (81.02) 
 Low load -41.34 (99.16) 0.56 (105.43) 
 High load -6.22 (69.05) -41.65 (69.21) 
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Chapter Nine. Summary and Further Directions 
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Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarises the main findings of this thesis, focusing on theoretical 
implications and further directions for research. The main topics of discussion are 
engagement and disengagement attentional biases, the role of attentional control when 
orienting to emotional faces, and top-down attentional contributions to the threat bias 
associated with social anxiety. This chapter also considers the interactions between the race 
of participants and the photographic face stimuli employed, as well as the role of top-down 
attention toward temporal threat biases. 
The current thesis has made several major findings. Specifically, this research 
employed a modified dot-probe design with emotional faces to determine the underlying 
mechanisms driving attention to faces, the limits to attentional control for socially anxious 
individuals, and the role of top-down attention in biases to threat. Chapter Five reported our 
discovery that participants from an unselected sample were able to use top-down attention to 
orient rapidly to cued facial expressions. However, attentional orienting toward the cued 
faces was disrupted when the faces were inverted, likely indicating that subjects required 
holistic processing of the face to rapidly orient toward it rather than relying on piecemeal 
processing (e.g., focusing only on the eyes or mouth). In addition, attention to faces was not 
significantly affected by selection history, either across repeating trials or block of trials. 
Chapter Six extended the findings of Chapter Five and found that social anxiety was not 
associated with a general deficit in attentional control. Instead, deficits only emerged for 
participants with high social anxiety when orienting to a happy face in the presence of a 
threatening distractor face. It was discovered that the threat bias for socially anxious 
individuals was characterised by differences in engagement with threat and not 
disengagement from threat (Chapters Seven and Eight). Finally, Chapter Eight revealed that 
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enhanced engagement with threat for individuals with high social anxiety was driven by top-
down, and not bottom-up, attentional guidance.   
Social Anxiety and Engagement With and Disengagement From Threat 
Summary of Findings and Implications  
There are three components of attention to threatening stimuli; facilitated 
engagement, delayed disengagement, and avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Past attempts to 
measure later attentional processes, such as delayed disengagement and avoidance of threat 
have often confounded these processes with engagement with threat (Judah, Grant, Lechner, 
& Mills, 2013; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). Chapters Seven and 
Eight of the present research used a recently developed paradigm, which allows these 
processes to be separately assessed (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014, 2016; Rudaizky, Basanovic, 
& MacLeod, 2014). In this paradigm, participants’ attention is initially secured either towards 
the location of a threatening face or in the opposite location in order to provide separate 
measures of engagement and disengagement biases. Modifications of this design were 
utilised in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis. Specifically, in Chapter Seven, an upright 
threatening or neutral face was paired with its inverted counterpart on each trial, and in 
Chapter Eight, a threatening and a neutral face were paired together on each trial, rather than 
employing inverted faces. Findings from the two studies concurred with respect to the effects 
of social anxiety on disengagement but differed with respect to the observed effects on 
engagement with threat. That is, both Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight found that social 
anxiety was not associated with differences in disengaging attention from threatening faces 
relative to neutral faces but showed differences with regard to engagement. This indicates 
that when the processes of engagement and disengagement are de-confounded, it is the 
processes of engagement, not disengagement, that differentiate socially anxious individuals. 
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Surprisingly, as reported in Chapter Seven, higher levels of social anxiety were 
associated with a reduced engagement bias to threat. This contrasts with the theoretical 
models of Rapee and Heimberg (1997) and Wong and Rapee (2016), which posit a bias 
toward threat in social anxiety. One possibility is that the presentation time (500ms) was too 
long and, so, participants may have initially engaged with threat but then rapidly avoided it, 
which meant that the dot-probe task only measured this second attentional process of 
avoidance. However, this possibility is questionable given that Grafton and MacLeod (2016) 
utilised a 500ms presentation time and found an engagement bias with threat for socially 
anxious individuals. Another possibility is that this unexpected finding stems from the nature 
of the paired image (intended to be non-threatening) presented at the same time as the 
threatening image. The choice of paired image on the dot-probe task has previously been 
found to impact the measurement of attentional bias. For example, Chen, Ehlers, Clark, and 
Mansell (2002) found that socially anxious participants had a bias away from faces, 
regardless of the emotion, when faces were paired with household objects. Therefore, in 
Chapter Seven, socially anxious individuals may have had a reduced engagement bias 
because, rather than focusing attention on the upright disgust faces, they were instead 
orienting to the paired inverted disgust faces. Indeed, participants could have initially 
oriented to the upright face and then had time in the 500ms presentation to orient to the 
inverted disgust face. Since social anxiety is characterised by hypervigilance to threat, 
socially anxious individuals may be more likely to monitor both obvious signs of threat 
(upright disgust faces) and ambiguous signs of threat (inverted disgust faces), compared with 
participants with lower levels of social anxiety. 
The study reported in Chapter Eight was conducted to address this issue. In this study, 
threatening and neutral faces were paired together on each trial and a briefer presentation 
time (200ms) was used. This time it was found that higher levels of social anxiety, relative to 
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lower levels of social anxiety, were associated with enhanced engagement with threat. This is 
consistent with Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) model of social anxiety, as described below. 
Moreover, since the study in Chapter Eight also corrected for the ambiguity in the threat 
value of the paired image in Chapter Seven, there is good reason to believe that these results 
best characterise the nature of the threat bias in social anxiety. That is, Chapter Eight more 
accurately reveals the attentional processes associated with social anxiety when individuals 
are faced with unambiguous threat in competition with a neutral stimulus. That said, it would 
be interesting in future research to further examine the nature of this potential bias toward 
ambiguous threat as, for example, a study could compare attention to inverted and rotated 
disgust expressions paired with neutral faces to test if socially anxious individuals have a bias 
toward threat, even when it is inverted or rotated (and, therefore, the identity of the 
expression is ambiguous). This will reveal whether socially anxious individuals have 
hypervigilance to ambiguous signs of threat. Such a study should also include images of 
happy faces to determine whether socially anxious individuals are hypervigilant to 
ambiguous threat specifically, or any ambiguous signs of social evaluation. It may also be 
worthwhile to assess the presentation times of the faces, as this bias may only occur at longer 
presentation times (e.g., 500ms), to allow individuals enough time to process the inverted 
face. 
Finally, a digit-span memory task, which only requires information maintenance in 
memory, was used in Chapter Seven whereas an arithmetic task requiring information to be 
maintained and manipulated in memory was used in Chapter Eight. We postulate that an 
arithmetic task may be more effective at exhausting WM resources, though further research 
may be needed to confirm this interpretation. Additional research is also needed to further 
understand the impact of WM load on executive and visuospatial stages of attention. That is, 
in line with past research, the current study conceptualised WM load as affecting top-down 
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attention. However, another possibility is that WM load may also impact the visuospatial 
stage of information processing. We do not believe that this is a likely explanation of the 
current findings as past research has found that WM load reduces perceptual processing for 
inattentional blindness tasks, in which the distractor is presented unexpectedly (Fougnie & 
Marois, 2007; Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 2005). However, the distractors in the dot-probe 
task were expected and other research using expected distractors have found the opposite 
pattern of results – increased visual distraction occurs under high WM load (see Lavie, 2005). 
Nevertheless, these conflicting findings highlight the importance of further research testing 
the role of WM load on both executive and visuospatial stages of visual attention. 
The results of Chapter Eight results are consistent with the results of Grafton and 
MacLeod (2016) who found engagement biases but not disengagement biases toward threat 
for individuals with social anxiety. These findings emphasise the importance of separately 
measuring engagement and disengagement biases so as not to confound the two effects with 
one another, as they are separate attentional processes. According to Rapee and Heimberg’s 
(1997) cognitive-behavioral model, social anxiety is associated with both enhanced 
engagement and delayed disengagement from threat. Biased attention to signs of disapproval 
from others confirms the individual’s prediction that he or she is being negatively evaluated, 
which further increases his or her levels of anxiety. The results of Chapter Eight only 
partially support Rapee and Heimberg’s predictions, finding evidence for enhanced 
engagement but not delayed disengagement from threat. This indicates that Rapee and 
Heimberg’s model requires updating to emphasise engagement biases with threat rather than 
disengagement biases. In addition, due to the differing results between Chapters Seven and 
Eight, in which a bias away from threat was found in one study and a bias toward threat was 
found in the other study, it is recommended that future models predict the situations under 
which biases toward and away from threat may be found. 
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Further Directions  
The current research has furthered our understanding of the threat bias indicating that, 
for rapidly presented images, socially anxious individuals experience enhanced engagement 
but not delayed disengagement from threat. However, open questions remain regarding 
attentional processes at later stages of attention (e.g., avoidance of threat), the processes of 
covert and overt attention, and variability in attention to threat. Past attempts to measure 
attentional avoidance of threat (e.g., Judah et al., 2013) have used long presentation times for 
images, arguing that this provides a measure of later stages of attention. However, this 
approach confounds components of attention such as enhanced attention, delayed 
disengagement and avoidance and does not allow for the measurement of variability in 
attention across time (e.g., shifts in engagement with threat, avoidance, and re-engagement 
with threat over time). 
An emerging area of research is the use of eye-tracking technology to measure 
attentional biases across time. Some studies have measured eye-movements to emotional 
faces for individuals with social anxiety. However, as with RT data, there have been 
inconsistent results. Several studies have found that social anxiety is associated with 
increased dwell time on threatening stimuli (Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Lazarov, Abend, & Bar-
Haim, 2016; Schofield, Johnson, Inhoff, & Coles, 2012). By contrast, other research has 
found evidence for rapid attentional orienting to emotional stimuli (though not threat-specific 
stimuli) for individuals with social anxiety with concurrent high state anxiety (Garner, Mogg, 
& Bradley, 2006). Several studies have also found that social anxiety is linked with 
differential responding to positive stimuli. For example, Schofield, Inhoff, and Coles (2013) 
found that, across 1500ms of image presentation on a dot-probe task, socially anxious 
individuals attended less to emotional expressions compared to control participants, whereas 
control participants preferentially attended to positive expressions. In addition, further 
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research found that socially anxious individuals disengaged attention from positive stimuli 
more readily than negative stimuli (Chen, Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2012) and, during a 
public speaking task, socially anxious individuals had an overall avoidance of emotional 
stimuli and reduced engagement of attention with positive stimuli (Chen, Clarke, MacLeod, 
Hickie, & Guastella, 2016). Finally, Singh, Capozzoli, Dodd, and Hope (2015) found that 
socially anxious participants, relative to low trait anxious participants, more rapidly engaged 
attention to neutral faces but had no differences in attention to angry faces. This body of 
research indicates that socially anxious participants may have biased overt attentional 
orienting both toward threatening stimuli and away from positive stimuli. 
These results should be interpreted with caution due to inconsistent findings. Some of 
this inconsistency may be because eye-movement research assesses overt attentional shifts 
but not covert attention. Saccadic eye movements are essential to develop a detailed and 
accurate mental representation of our visual field. Specifically, eye movements allow the 
foveal, which has high acuity, to process important parts of the visual field. Attentional shifts 
can also occur, though, without accompanying eye-movements, as covert attentional shifts 
result in enhanced processing at attended locations (Mangun et al., 2001; Posner, 1980). 
Indeed, research indicates that attention can guide eye-movements, either facilitating or 
suppressing a saccade to an attended location (Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2009). As suggested 
by Singh et al. (2015), one possible explanation for the lack of threat bias found in their eye-
tracking study was that, on neutral-angry face pair trials, socially anxious participants may 
have covertly attended to the angry face and then avoided orienting toward it (thus overtly 
orienting to the neutral face more rapidly instead of the angry face). The measurement of 
overt attention alone (through the use of eye-movement data) cannot provide information on 
the possibility of covert attentional shifts that result in suppressed saccades to the location of 
threat. To more thoroughly understand the interplay between overt and covert attention, it is 
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recommended that eye-movement technology should not replace visual tasks using RT and 
accuracy data (e.g., dot-probe, visual search, and spatial cueing tasks). Instead, eye-
movements can be measured in conjunction with accuracy and RT data in visual experiments 
to provide a more thorough assessment of attentional biases. 
Another reason to be hesitant about relying on eye-movement data alone is that there 
have been limited research on the reliability of eye-tracking technology. For example, 
Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, and Oakman (2014) recently reported that eye-tracking 
technology has low reliability for first fixations and the proportion of viewing time in the first 
1,500ms. However, eye movements indices (the proportion of fixation frequencies and 
proportion of viewing time) were found to have good reliability across the total 5,000ms 
image presentation. It is, therefore, recommended that further research computes and reports 
the reliability of eye-tracking to refine the use of this technology. 
The dot-probe task has also been associated with low reliability. With an unselected 
university sample, Schmukle (2005) and Staugaard (2009) assessed split-half and test-retest 
reliabilities of the dot-probe task. Schmukle (2005) employed words and pictures and 
measured each participant’s split-half reliabilities on bias scores, finding low reliability 
estimates (all below r = 0.20). In addition, test-retest reliability estimates, comparing bias 
scores measured with a one-week interval, were also low, ranging between -.22 and +.32. 
Similarly, using photographic faces, Staugaard (2009) reported split-half estimates ranging 
between -.29 and +.37, and test-retest reliability estimates ranging between -.24 and +.26. 
Using a sample of high and low socially anxious participants, these findings have been 
replicated by Waechter et al. (2014), revealing that bias scores (i.e., difference scores 
calculated from invalid and valid trials) had low reliability. However, raw RT scores had 
good reliability (estimates = +.85-.96). These researchers argued that the low reliabilities for 
bias scores were likely because of high correlations between conditions. 
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Interesting, Bar-Haim et al. (2010) reported higher reliability estimates on bias scores 
using a dot-probe tasks with a civilian population living near the Gaza Strip, reporting a split-
half reliability of r = +.45, p < 0.0001. It is possible that this result may reflect sampling 
error. However, another possibility is that the sample or design characteristics of this study 
resulted in higher reliability rates. As with eye-tracking data, it is recommended that further 
research compute and report reliability estimates. This will guide our understanding of the 
conditions under which the dot-probe task may have higher reliability. 
However, rather than necessarily reflecting an issue with the dot-probe task or eye-
tracking technology, it is possible that the low reliability estimates indicate that attention to 
threat is characterised by high variability. It is, therefore, critical to assess trial-by-trial 
variability in attending to threat when considering the temporal dynamics of the threat bias. 
To illustrate, consider this possibility: in an experiment, an individual displays strong 
enhanced engagement with threat on half of the trials and strong avoidance of threat on the 
other half of trials. By contrast, another individual consistently displays no biases toward or 
away from threat throughout an experiment. When their overall mean RTs are measured, both 
appear to have no biased attention to threat even though their patterns of responding over the 
experiment were markedly different. It is crucial that variability in attentional patterns is 
assessed fully to properly understand the threat bias processes. 
Using a dot-probe task, Zvielli, Vrijsen, Koster, and Bernstein (2016) have developed 
an elegant approach to measure variability in attending to threat. Specifically, results from 
temporally contiguous pairs of congruent trails (in which the probe followed a threatening 
image) were subtracted from results from incongruous trials (in which the probe followed a 
neutral image) to calculate a trial-level bias score. This study found that, compared with 
healthy control participants, spider phobic participants displayed enhanced variability in 
attending to spider-related material throughout the experiment. This indicates that biased 
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attention to threat fluctuates across time. The importance of measuring variability in attention 
is further supported by a growing body of literature (Bardeen, Daniel, Hinnant, & Orcutt, 
2017; Cox, Christensen, & Goodhew, 2018; Gladwin, 2017; Iacoviello et al., 2014; Naim et 
al., 2015; Schäfer et al., 2016; Swick & Ashley, 2017; Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2015). 
For example, Cox et al. (2018) found that trait anxious participants displayed greater 
fluctuations in attentional bias to negative stimuli compared with neutral stimuli. It is, 
therefore, recommended that, in addition to mean levels of performance, further research 
should measure and assess individual variability in performance.  
The Role of Attentional Control When Orienting to Emotional Faces 
Summary of Findings and Implications 
Chapter Five investigated the general attentional principles underlying attention to 
emotional faces, finding that participants could use top-down attention to rapidly attend to 
emotional faces. Furthermore, no cueing effects were found when the faces were inverted, 
likely suggesting that top-down attentional processes require holistic face processing. Note 
that there has been debate regarding holistic processing of inverted faces, with some 
researchers proposing that inversion leads to quantitative not qualitative changes in face 
processing (e.g., Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2011; Sekuler Gaspar, Gold, & 
Bennett, 2004; though see Rossion, 2008 for a response). One alternative explanation is that 
inversion disrupts the meaningfulness and recognisability of the individual face parts (e.g., it 
may be difficult to perceive a mouth as smiling when it is inverted). To test this, further 
research can use faces in which the individual face parts are intact and presented upright but 
are scrambled. If cueing is not found for scrambled faces, this would offer further support to 
the conclusion that holistic face processing is required for rapid top-down attentional 
orienting to emotional faces. 
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Finally, no evidence of selection history was found. Chapter Six extended on this 
research, finding that high social anxiety was associated with selective deficits in orienting to 
happy faces when paired with a threatening distractor face, but not in the other conditions. 
This indicates that social anxiety is not associated with a generic deficit in top-down control 
but, instead one that is selectively activated in the presence of distracting (non-task relevant) 
threat. In addition, it was found that social anxiety was not associated with differences in 
selection history to emotional faces. That said, however, no selection history effects were 
found for any of the participants, which may have limited our ability to observe anxiety-
specific effects. 
According to Peschard and Philippot’s (2016) model, working memory (WM) serves 
as an interface, resolving information from external and internal sources. Attentional focus is 
influenced by several factors, including task goals, attentional control, emotional or 
motivational value, long-term memory, stimulus salience, and selection history. These 
researchers proposed that social anxiety may be associated with differences in selection 
history effects, which may be associated with increased rumination following exposure to a 
social situation. However, the current study found that, with an unselected sample, selection 
history appeared to play no role in attentional orienting to emotional faces. This was 
supported by both trial-by-trial analyses and keeping the same expression constant across a 
block of trials (Chapter Five). In addition, no relationship was found between social anxiety 
and selection history effects (Chapter Six), indicating that, even for participants with high 
social anxiety, selection history did not significantly contribute to attentional orienting to 
emotional faces. 
The observed lack of selection history effects was surprising given that selection 
history effects have been well-documented using basic visual stimuli, such as shapes and 
colours (Belopolsky & Awh, 2016; Theeuwes, Reimann, & Mortier, 2006; Theeuwes & Van 
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der Burg, 2011). Indeed, Theeuwes (2013) argued that feature-based attentional orienting is 
the result of selection history (referred to as bottom-up priming) but not top-down attentional 
control. However, although top-down attention may play a minimal role in the presence of 
pop-out visual arrays, Belopolsky and Awh (2016) confirmed that top-down attention guides 
orienting for visually complex arrays. In their task, participants were presented with a verbal 
colour cue and viewed a six-circle array and then asked to identify the target and report the 
orientation of a line presented within it. When the target was a different colour to the 
distractors (pop-out design), selection history effects were observed but top-down knowledge 
of the target did not reliably improve performance. By contrast, when pop-out effects were 
eliminated as the target and distractors were all presented in unique colours, both selection 
history and top-down attention had separate contributions to target detection. Thus, the 
findings of the current research offer confirmatory evidence for the role of top-down 
attentional control for attentional orienting to complex scenes (i.e., faces). However, it also 
raises the question: why was selection history effects not found in the current study? 
As discussed in Chapter Five, there are several possibilities for why selection history 
effects may not have been found in the current research. Firstly, selection history effects may 
only emerge for basic visual stimuli but not for complex stimuli, such as photographic faces. 
Secondly, in the current research, selection history effects were measured by repeating the 
same facial expression across trials, but the actual photograph could change (i.e., a 
photograph of a happy face from one individal could change to a happy face of a different 
individual). Thus, selection history effects may be limited to repetition of identical 
exemplars, and not generalise to category-level effects. Thirdly, selection history effects may 
only emerge for particular tasks. In standard selection history paradigms, participants make a 
response about the stimulus that is repeated. However, in the dot-probe task in the present 
research, participants respond to a separate stimulus (the probe) from the stimuli that they had 
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used to guide their attention (i.e., the face). It is possible that selection history effects may 
have emerged if participants were required to respond to the identity of the face itself (e.g., its 
gender). The fact that there were no selection history effects for low or high anxious 
participants indicates that we have discovered important boundary conditions for selection 
history effects, but it also possibly constrained our ability to observe differences between 
individuals with respect to selection history. Therefore, further research is needed to 
disentangle these possibilities for why a selection history effect was not found. Then further 
research can be conducted confirming the role of selection history in the guidance of attention 
to threat for individuals with high social anxiety. 
Peschard and Philippot’s (2016) also proposed that socially anxious individuals have 
a general deficit in attentional control, and that this may be moderated by the social threat 
value of the visual stimuli. Similarly, Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007) proposed that anxiety impairs the functioning of goal-directed, top-
down attention and increases the influences of bottom-up attention. Therefore, anxious 
individuals may have particular difficulty inhibiting attention to threat. Furthermore, similar 
to Peschard and Philippot’s model, Attentional Control Theory proposed that anxious 
individuals also have general deficits in the ability to inhibit attention to distracting stimuli. 
However, these deficits will not always be observable as anxious individuals may engage in 
compensatory strategies, such as increased effort on the task. Nevertheless, deficits will be 
observable under particular situations, such as when multiple attentionally demanding tasks 
are performed at once. 
The current study found that socially anxious participants had deficits in top-down 
control in the presence of a threatening distractor when orienting attention to happy faces. 
However, a general deficit in attentional control was not found, as the socially anxious 
participants were able to successfully orient to the cued faces in all other conditions. One 
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possible inference, therefore, is that deficits in attentional control are more likely to be 
revealed in the presence of social threat, but general deficits may only occur under particular 
conditions. Previous research exploring attentional control has found that social anxiety is 
associated with lower self-reported attentional control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008). In addition, 
Wieser, Pauli, and Muhlberger (2009) found that, on an antisaccade task with faces, 
individuals with high social anxiety had a higher antisaccade error rate regardless of 
emotional expression, indicating that they had difficulty inhibiting reflexive orienting to 
facial expressions. Liang (2018) investigated the issue further employing a non-emotional 
mixed antisaccade task, testing socially anxious and non-anxious control participants in both 
blocked conditions (in which they only either performed pro- or antisaccades) or a mixed 
condition (in which the performance of pro- and antisaccades could vary on a trial-by-trial 
basis). These researchers found that that, in blocked conditions, socially anxious participants 
had longer antisaccade latencies compared with non-anxious control participants but had no 
differences in prosaccades or error rates. By contrast, in the mixed condition, the socially 
anxious participants had longer latencies for both pro- and antisaccades. This indicates that 
socially anxious participants consistently demonstrated difficulties with inhibition to 
distracting stimuli and, also, demonstrated greater difficulties on the mixed task, either due to 
difficulties shifting between two tasks or because of the impact of higher cognitive load. 
Deficits in attentional control to non-emotional stimuli for socially anxious individuals, 
therefore, may be particularly evident on more demanding tasks. In sum, Wieser et al. (2009) 
found that socially anxious participants had a general deficit in attentional control in response 
to all faces, rather than a specific deficit when threatening faces were employed, and Liang 
(2018) found general attentional control deficits in the absence of emotional stimuli. 
This raises the question: why was a general deficit in attentional control found on the 
antisaccade task for socially anxious participants but the present research found a specific 
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deficit in attentional control in the presence of distracting threat? One possibility is that the 
antisaccade task may be more attentionally demanding than the dot-probe task. Therefore, 
deficits in attentional control may be more likely to be revealed in the presence of threatening 
distractor stimuli but general deficits may emerge on difficult tasks. Further research is 
needed to systematically test the conditions under which these deficits in attentional control 
emerge for socially anxious individuals.  
Further Directions  
Due to our important finding that poor attentional control may underlie attentional 
capture by threatening distractors, the next avenue for follow-up research aimed at 
developing therapeutic strategies for people with Social Anxiety Disorder is the use of 
effective training techniques to improve attentional control. As discussed in the introduction 
of this thesis, Attention Bias Modification (ABM) has emerged as a potential treatment of 
social anxiety in which participants are trained either to attend to positive or neutral stimuli 
and ignore threatening stimuli. However, the results have been inconsistent, with some 
studies finding that ABM has resulted in reduced social anxiety (Amir et al., 2009; Amir, 
Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 2008; Heeren, Reese, McNally, & Philippot, 2012; Li, 
Tan, Qian, & Liu, 2008; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009), but other studies 
failing to replicate that finding (Boettcher, Berger, & Renneberg, 2012; Carlbring et al., 2012; 
Heeren, Lievens, & Philippot, 2011; Julian, Beard, Schmidt, Powers, & Smits, 2012; 
McNally, Enock, Tsai, & Tousian, 2013). In addition, some studies have even found that 
training to attend to threat resulted in reduced anxiety (Boettcher et al., 2013; Klumpp & 
Amir, 2010). 
One possibility is that attentional control moderates these improvements in anxiety. 
This possibility was tested by Basanovic, Notebaert, Grafton, Hirsch, and Clarke (2017). To 
assess attentional control, individual differences in the ability in inhibit attention to goal-
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irrelevant stimuli and the ability to selectively attend to goal-relevant stimuli were measured. 
Participants also completed a single-session ABM task, in which they were trained to 
encourage an attention bias either toward threat or away from threat. This study found that 
increased attentional control was associated with changes in attentional bias in the direction 
encouraged by the ABM procedure, with both inhibition and selection independently 
contributing to change in bias. In addition, these differences did not differ depending on 
whether participants were trained to attend or avoid negative stimuli. Note that this study did 
not assess changes in emotional state or anxiety after attentional training and so it is not 
known whether differences in attentional control also moderated improvements in anxiety 
after training. However, given the change in bias scores – which are typically associated with 
anxiety – it is promising from a therapeutic perspective that attentional control is an 
important moderating variable in clinical outcomes for ABM. 
Consistent with this notion, Cohen et al. (2016) experimentally investigated the 
effects of trained attentional control and found that this led to neurobiological changes that 
would be consistent with reduced psychological anxiety, although unfortunately this was not 
specifically measured. In this experiment, participants completed training with an arrow 
flanker task with either 80% incongruent trials or 20% incongruent trials. Training with a 
higher proportion of incongruent trials necessitates the engagement of attentional control in 
subjects. The amygdala, which is a key brain area responsible for processing emotional 
stimuli, was then measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). It was found 
that participants who received the training with the 80% incongruent trials had lower 
amygdala activation to emotional stimuli relative to the participants who received training 
with the 20% incongruent trials. This is a very interesting result as it demonstrates that 
training with non-emotional stimuli to improve attentional control results in a reduced impact 
of emotional content in the brain. 
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Further evidence for the effect of attentional training on clinical outcomes comes from 
Sari, Koster, Pourtois, and Derakshan (2016), who conducted WM training with high trait 
anxious participants. Over a three-week period, participants engaged in daily attentional 
training with an adaptive dual n-back task, in which participants were required to remember 
the association between a letter and its location on a screen and respond to matches with 
previous trials. It was found that attentional training resulted in improvements in attentional 
control, as assessed by both performance on a flanker task and resting state 
electroencephalography (EEG). Overall anxiety symptoms did not significantly improve in 
the training group or control group. Instead, improvements in anxiety only occurred for 
participants with high engagement in the training task. This research indicates that attentional 
control training is a promising new avenue of research and that further research should 
consider the moderating variable of engagement in training. 
The current study found that deficits in attentional control are particularly apparent for 
individuals with social anxiety in the presence of distracting threat. One possibility, therefore, 
is that attentional training to teach individuals to ignore threat could result in greater gains 
than attentional training with neutral stimuli. It is recommended that these two training 
programs be compared, by assessing which program leads to the greatest gains in attentional 
control, reduced attentional biases to threat, and reduced levels of social anxiety. This line of 
research will help optimise attentional training programs to target symptoms of social 
anxiety.  
Social Anxiety and Top-Down Contributions for the Threat Bias  
Summary of Findings and Implications 
Bottom-up attention to threat facilitates survival, allowing individuals to rapidly 
orient to and respond to potential survival risks (e.g., snakes and spiders) (Kenrick, Neuberg, 
Griskevicius, Becker, & Schaller, 2010; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; LeDoux, 1996; 
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LoBue, Rakison, & DeLoache, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman, 2007). The 
assumption of most threat-detection models has been that the threat bias in anxiety is driven 
by an overactive bottom-up attentional system (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007; Öhman, 1996, 
2005; Öhman & Wiens, 2004). In a review by Cisler and Koster (2010), the eight most 
influential models of attentional bias in anxiety were identified: Beck and Clark’s (1997) 
cognitive model, Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews’ (1988) model, Öhman’s (1996) 
feature detection model, Wells and Matthews’ (1994) model, Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) 
cognitive-motivational model, Mathews and Mackintosh’s (1998) model, Eysenck et al.’s 
(2007) attentional control theory, and Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg 
and van IJzendoorn’s (2007) model. Of those models, only Wells and Matthews’ (1994) does 
not include a bottom-up, automatic threat-detection system. Their model, instead, proposes 
that anxious individuals hold a belief that it is important to monitor threat, thus resulting in a 
threat bias. 
In Chapters Seven and Eight, two possibilities were tested: (1) individuals with higher 
levels of social anxiety may have deficits in top-down control, leading to difficulties 
inhibiting attention to the bottom-up capture of attention to threatening stimuli; or (2) 
individuals with higher levels of social anxiety may have a chronic top-down attentional set 
for threat. That is, even when given a competing goal (e.g., attend to happy faces), they 
maintain an attentional set regarding threat detection that is difficult to overcome. This is 
consistent with previous research, which has found that participants can hold multiple 
attentional control sets concurrently (Adamo, Pun, Pratt, & Ferber, 2008). Therefore, when 
instructed to attend to positive stimuli, individuals with higher levels of social anxiety may 
simultaneously maintain an attentional set for threat, leading to difficulties shifting attention 
to positive stimuli. These two possibilities result in different predictions about how the 
attentional bias toward threat in social anxiety will fare under conditions of WM load which 
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tax shared top-down resources. Specifically, possibility one predicts that biased attention to 
threat associated with high social anxiety would be unaffected by the load manipulation. 
However, possibility two predicts that, if top-down attentional resources are required for 
participants to shift toward the threatening faces, the engagement bias will reduce in the high-
load condition. The current thesis (Chapter Eight) found evidence for the second hypothesis 
indicating a chronic top-down set for threat. This is because the engagement bias toward 
threat was eliminated under WM load which taxed shared top-down resources. The current 
research contradicts the dominant view that the threat bias in socially anxiety is bottom-up, 
finding instead that it requires top-down resources. This finding indicates that top-down goals 
and beliefs are integral to the conceptualisation of threat detection for socially anxious 
individuals. 
The current study did not assess the specific top-down beliefs that could drive biased 
attention to threat. However, Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) 
predicted that maladaptive beliefs underly biased attention to threat. Clark and Wells (1995) 
identified three categories of maladaptive beliefs for socially anxious individuals; 
(1) excessively high standards for social performance (e.g., “I must always be witty and 
intelligent”), (2) conditional beliefs concerning social evaluation (e.g., “if I show my feelings, 
others will reject me”), and (3) unconditional beliefs about the self (e.g., “I’m stupid”, “I’m 
different”, “I’m unattractive”). These self-beliefs may lead individuals to interpret social 
situations (e.g., going to a party) as dangerous, motivating them to monitor their environment 
for signs of threat. These two cognitive models diverge with respect to their predictions about 
biased attention to threat, as Clark and Wells predicted that socially anxious individuals 
engage in self-focussed attention at the expense of attention to external signs of threat, 
whereas Rapee and Heimberg predicted that socially anxious individuals engage in biased 
attention to both internal and external signs of threat. The current findings are consistent with 
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Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) prediction that, in socially-evaluative situations, socially 
anxious individuals preferentially allocate attention to critical facial expressions. Rapee and 
Heimberg also predicted that this biased attention to threat can be extremely unhelpful as it 
reinforces negative self-beliefs and beliefs that others are judgemental and rejecting, resulting 
in increased social anxiety. 
The current study found that top-down orienting to emotional faces was present for 
upright faces but eliminated for inverted faces. Inversion disrupts the ability to process a face 
holistically, as instead individuals rely on piecemeal processing of individual face parts 
(Mondloch & Maurer, 2008; Searcy & Bartlett, 1996; Yin, 1969). Attentional orienting can 
be associated with space-, feature-, or object-based attention. The results of the current study 
likely indicate that participants were not simply orienting to individual facial features 
(e.g., the mouth or eyes). Instead, the top-down set for the cued face relied on object-based 
attention. This is consistent with other research that has assessed object-based attention to 
faces. For example, O'Craven, Downing, and Kanwisher (1999) presented participants with 
images of a house and face transparently superimposed on one another, with one moving 
whilst the other remained stationary on each trial. Participants were instructed to either attend 
to the face, house, or motion of one of the objects. Attention to different attributes of the 
attended and unattended objects was assessed with fMRI. This study found that, although the 
three attributes shared the one location, attending to one attribute of an object resulted in 
enhanced neutral processing of both the cued attribute as well as the task-irrelevant attribute 
of that object. For example, attending to the motion of a face resulted in changes in the blood 
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal to the middle temporal/medial superior temporal area 
responsible for motion, as well as the fusiform face area responsible for processing faces. 
Therefore, attention to a face resulted in enhanced neural representation of all attributes of the 
face, rather than attending only to task-relevant features. In addition, these results could not 
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be explained by a space-based model of attention as participants displayed an enhanced 
neural response to the attended object compared with the unattended object, even though they 
occupied the same position in space. The results of the current study further add to this 
research, suggesting that object-based attention can be used to orient to specific emotional 
expressions, such as anger and happiness.  
Further Directions  
Further important avenues of research are to develop a more thorough understanding 
of the relationship between top-down beliefs and the threat bias and investigate how 
interventions aimed at changing these beliefs may reduce the threat bias. Firstly, to develop a 
thorough predictive model of the threat bias, further research should investigate whether the 
degree to which an individual endorses particular socially-relevant beliefs is associated with 
the threat bias. For example, individual differences in each of the three types of beliefs 
formulated by Clark and Wells (1995; high standards for performance, social-evaluative 
beliefs, and negative self-beliefs) could differentially predict the threat bias. In addition, 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) proposed that increased threat detection is not stable as the 
process is activated in social situations in which there is a perceived audience. The 
relationship between the type of social-evaluative situation (e.g., speech task, small-group 
task etc), the type of beliefs that are activated, and the degree of bias toward and/or away 
from threatening facial expressions could be investigated. 
An additional avenue of research is to investigate whether altering particular social-
evaluative beliefs results in similar reductions in biased attention to threat. The purpose of 
cognitive therapy is to identify and challenge unhelpful cognitive beliefs. One avenue for 
further research, therefore, is to measure the threat bias before participants receive cognitive 
therapy aimed at altering social beliefs. Following therapy, further research can assess 
whether the degree of change in those beliefs predict changes in the threat bias. 
295 
 
Impact of Race on Face Processing 
Although it was beyond the scope of this thesis, it is recommended that further 
research explores the relationship between the race of participants, the race of the faces 
employed, and biased attention to threat in social anxiety. Previous research has found that 
people tend to have better recognition for the identity and emotional expressions of own-race 
faces compared with cross-race faces (for a review, see Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & 
Sacco, 2012). This difference appears to be associated with different processing styles for 
faces. For example, Goldinger, He, and Papesh (2009) conducted an experiment in which 
they measured Caucasian and Asian participants’ eye-movements and pupil diameters when 
viewing faces in preparation for a recognition memory test. These researchers found that, 
compared with cross-race trials, on own-race trials participants displayed more fixations to 
facial features, briefer gaze times per fixation, more fixations to unique features, and fewer 
regressions. Blais, Jack, Scheepers, Fiset, and Caldara (2008) also found race-based face 
processing effects, as individuals from different cultures demonstrated different processing 
patterns for examining faces, with Caucasian participants focusing more on the eyes and East 
Asian participants focusing more on the nose and mouth. Furthermore, initial evidence 
indicates that patterns of vigilance and/or avoidance of attention to other-race faces is 
influenced by threat-value (Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008), visual novelty (Al-
Janabi, MacLeod, & Rhodes, 2012), and external motivation to appear non-prejudiced (Bean 
et al., 2012). 
The experiments of Chapters Five, Six, and Eight employed Caucasian faces and only 
tested Caucasian participants; participant restrictions were chosen to minimise variability in 
the data due to cross-race effects. However, unfortunately, this also meant that the results 
were not necessarily representative of the general population. In Chapter Seven, which was 
conducted prior to the other studies, the images selected were Caucasian, but no race-based 
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restrictions were placed on participants. Since this study was largely conducted over the 
summer holidays at the Australian National University and offered paid participation, a large 
number of international students who stayed in Australia over the university break 
participated in this study. That is, 33% of participants identified as Caucasian/White, 62% as 
Asian, 1% as Black and 4% as Hispanic. Although not reported in Chapter Seven, due to 
length restrictions on the published manuscript, post-hoc analyses were performed to assess 
the relationships between participants’ race and engagement and disengagement biases to 
threat. To analyse the engagement bias, a repeated-measures ANCOVA was performed with 
the within-subject factor of load (no, low, and high), between-subjects factor of race 
(Caucasian and non-Caucasian), and the continuous variable of social anxiety. No significant 
main or interactive effects of race were found (ps ≥ .278). Similarly, an ANCOVA was 
conducted assessing the disengagement bias scores, which revealed non-significant main and 
interactive effects of race (ps ≥ .164). These analyses indicate that race did not have a large 
impact on attention to neutral and disgust faces on a dot-probe task. However, this study did 
not measure important race-related factors such as country of birth, childhood exposure to 
other-race faces, and time spent in Australia. Further research is needed to test the 
relationship between social anxiety and attention to same-race and cross-race faces for 
individuals of differing racial backgrounds.  
Further Directions for Temporal Attentional Biases to Threat 
 The current thesis focussed on attentional orienting to threat across space. However, 
an additional avenue for research is understanding attentional biases across time. In everyday 
social interactions, facial expressions can change rapidly, such as from approving to 
disapproving (Goffman, 1967). Two paradigms that assess temporal biases to threat are 
emotion induced blindness (EIB) and the attentional blink (AB). In EIB, participants search 
for a target (e.g., a rotated landscape/architectural image) embedded in a stream of rapidly 
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(e.g., 100ms/item) presented upright distractors (e.g., usually of landscape/architectural 
images). Research has found that participants are worse at detecting the target when it is 
preceded closely in time by an emotionally negative image compared with a neutral image 
(Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005; Most & Jungé, 2008). In addition, further research has 
found that participants who score higher on measures of harm avoidance (which is related to 
trait anxiety), have differential temporal threat detection. Specifically, in a study by Most et 
al. (2005), participants were either given a specific search strategy, in which they searched 
for a rotated image of a building, or a less specific search strategy, in which they searched for 
a rotated image that could either be a building or landscape. Harm avoidance did not predict 
differences in emotion-induced blindness for the non-specific attentional set condition. 
However, in the specific attentional set condition, lower levels of harm avoidance were 
associated with improved target detection. One likely interpretation of these findings is that 
participants with higher harm avoidance had reduced attentional control and so they were 
unable to overcome their threat bias even when given a specific search goal. That is, Most et 
al. suggested that attentional control could mediate the effects, as attentional control may 
have been used to filter out the irrelevant stimuli more efficiently, reducing the initial 
engagement with the threat and/or attentional control may have facilitated rapid 
disengagement of attention from the threatening images. 
A second paradigm for measuring temporal attention biases is the AB task. In this 
task, participants view a stream of rapidly presented visual stimuli (e.g., letters and numbers) 
and try to identify two targets. An AB reflects the finding that the second target (T2) cannot 
be identified if it appears in close proximity (e.g., 200-300ms) to the first target (T1) 
(Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). This design has been 
used with face stimuli to measure a threat-related AB associated with social anxiety. For 
example, de Jong and Martens (2007) presented participants with a stream of faces; the 
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distractors were neutral faces that were rotated 180° and the T1 and T2 could either be of 
upright happy or angry faces, and participants were instructed to report how many faces in 
the stream were upright. Results were that participants displayed a reduced AB when T2 was 
an angry face. In addition, an angry T2 face resulted in greater difficulty identifying a happy 
T1 face. Neither of these effects were associated with high or low levels of social anxiety. 
This research, therefore, revealed an anger superiority effect but, surprisingly, this was not 
enhanced for participants with high levels of social anxiety. Subsequent research using letter 
stimuli as T1 and emotional faces as T2 found that emotional faces (happy and angry), 
resulted in an attenuated AB for the emotional faces relative to neutral faces, irrespective of 
social anxiety (de Jong, Koster, van Wees, & Martens, 2009). However, other research has 
found a differential AB associated with social anxiety, but only for participants with co-
morbid depression; as these participants were less accurate at T2 identification if T1 
consisted of a negative scene (Skinner & Ferguson, 2014). In addition, Morrison et al. (2016) 
found that participants with comorbid social anxiety and depression had reduced accuracy for 
T2 on a standard AB task (with letters and numbers). Morrison et al. (2016) posited that their 
results may be due to poor attentional control that is found for individuals with both high 
social anxiety and depression. However, since this is an emerging area of research, possible 
underlying mechanisms of a temporal bias to threat (or deficits in temporal attention to 
neutral stimuli) have not yet been tested. 
In line with the findings of the current study, the body of literature on temporal 
attentional biases also indicates that attentional control may be a critical mediating factor 
linking social anxiety and biased attention to threat. Top-down attentional control may be 
critical to our ability to resist interference from threat detection both throughout our spatial 
environment, as well as from one moment to the next. It is recommended that further research 
measure the relationship between individual differences in attentional control and temporal 
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attentional biases to threat, as well as the impact of attentional control training on these 
biases. However, the finding that temporal attentional biases to threat may only be found for 
participants with comorbid anxiety and depression is surprising. This points to the possibility 
that there may be some differences in the attentional mechanisms driving temporal and 
spatial biased attention. Further research is needed to understand the mechanisms driving 
temporal biases and to understand why they are present for individuals with comorbid social 
anxiety and depression but not for individuals with high social anxiety alone.      
Conclusion 
The evidence presented in this thesis challenges the dominant perspective that social 
anxiety is associated with an enhanced bottom-up bias to threat and, instead, indicates that the 
bias is driven by top-down attention. More specifically, the research comprising this thesis 
found that individuals with high social anxiety had enhanced engagement with threatening 
facial expressions, but this bias was eliminated when attentional top-down resources were 
depleted by a concurrent task. This is consistent with cognitive models of social anxiety 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997), which proposed that individuals with 
social anxiety believe that others have high expectations for their performance, that it is 
unlikely that they will meet up to these expectations, and failure to do so will be disastrous 
(e.g., lead to rejection). I predict that these beliefs result in top-down attention to sources of 
negative evaluation from others and this preferential attention likely confirms their socially-
relevant beliefs, continuing to lead to biased attention to threat. 
The research in this thesis also found that, when given a clear top-down set 
(e.g., attend to a happy expression), individuals with high levels of social anxiety had specific 
deficits in top-down control in the presence of distracting negative stimuli. It is, therefore, 
likely that the top-down goal of attending to threat is chronic with social anxiety and cannot 
easily be overcome by a competing goal. This research points to two particularly important 
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predictions to be tested: firstly, it is predicted that modifying socially-relevant beliefs will 
lead to reductions in the threat bias, and secondly, training to enhance attentional control will 
enable individuals with high levels of social anxiety to orient to goal-driven stimuli rather 
than preferentially attending to threat. The findings of the current thesis provide critical 
information on the role of top-down attention to the threat bias associated with social anxiety. 
This marks a movement beyond simply measuring the threat bias to understanding the 
mechanisms maintaining it. As a deeper understanding of social anxiety is developed, we can 
move closer to breaking the reinforcing link between biased attention to threat and social 
anxiety. This will help individuals with high levels of social anxiety remove their “threat-
coloured-glasses” and, rather than focusing on potential sources of judgment, attend to signs 
of acceptance and approval from others.  
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